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Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms
Steven A. Bank*

Abstract
This Article examines the use offederal tax provisions to effect changes in
state law corporategovernance. There is a growingacademiccontroversy
over these provisions,fueled in partby their popularityamong legislators
as a method of addressingthe recent spate of corporatescandals. As a
case study on the use of tax to regulate corporategovernance, this paper
compares and contrasts two measures enacted during the New Deal-the
enactment of the undistributedprofits tax in 1936 and the overhaul of the
tax-free reorganizationprovisionsin 1934-andconsiders why theformer
was so much more controversialand less sustainablethan the latter. While
some of the difference can be explained by the different political and
economic circumstancessurroundingeach proposal, this Article argues
that the divergence in the degree of oppositioncan be explained inpart by
an examination of the extent to which each provision threatened an
underlying norm, or longstandingstandard,of corporate behavior. The
Article goes on to test this norms-basedexplanation againstseveralrecent
attempts to enact corporate governance-oriented tax provisions and
concludes that it has modern relevance. The implication is that while
Congress may use the Tax Code to reinforce existing norms of corporate
behavior, it is likely to be less successful when it tries to use the Code to
change existing norms or introduce new ones.
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. Introduction
President Bush's proposal to end double taxation, which was justified in
part because it would increase dividends and thereby improve corporate
"accountability,"' was only the latest example of the federal government's
1. See United States Department of Treasury, Eliminate the Double Taxation of
CorporateEarnings,availableat http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releasesfdocs/bluebook.pdf (last

visited Feb. 2, 2004) ("[The proposal will enhance corporate governance by eliminating the
current bias against the payment of dividends. Dividends can provide evidence of a
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effort to use the Internal Revenue Code as a tool to modify corporate behavior.
In recent years, Congress has enacted or introduced a number of corporate
governance-motivated tax provisions-from limiting deductions for allegedly
excessive executive compensation and imposing excise taxes on the receipt of
so-called "greenmail" payments during takeovers to denying deductions both
for stock options that have been expensed for accounting purposes and for
punitive damage payments.2 In fact, almost since the inception of the corporate
income tax, Congress has recognized its potential to serve as a de facto system
of federal corporate law. Proponents of the earliest corporate income tax in
1894 predicted that one of its benefits would be the "salutary" influence it
would have on corporations by establishing a means of federal oversight.3
When President Taft later proposed an excise tax on corporations in 1909, he
corporation's underlying financial health and enable investors to evaluate more readily a
corporation's financial condition. This, in turn, increases the accountability of corporate
management to its investors.").
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000) (limiting the deductibility of non-performance based
executive compensation to $I million); I.R.C. § 5881 (2000) (levying an excise tax on the
receipt of "greenmail," or above-market payments by target management to a shareholder
mounting a hostile takeover bid); I.R.C. §§ 280G & 4999 (2000) (disallowing deductions of
certain "golden parachute" payments, or payments to departing target executives upon a change
of control, and imposing an excise tax on their receipt); S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing
the "Ending the Double Standard for Stock Option Act" to only allow corporations to deduct
nonqualified stock options to the extent of the amount treated as expenses for purposes of
reporting earnings); S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing the "Jumpstart Our Business
Strength Act" (JOBS).to, among other things, end deductibility for punitive damages and to
require CEO signatures on tax returns). Treasury has not always been a willing partner in
Congress's decision to use the Tax Code as a tool to influence corporate governance. See
Sheryl Stratton, Treasury: FixExecutive Comp Abuse But Lay Off the Tax Code, 99 TAx NOTES
191, 191-92 (2003) (reporting on comments made by Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Policy Pamela F. Olson in opposition to efforts to use the Code to combat Enron executive's
abuse of the compensation system).
The United States is not alone in its effort to use the tax system as a tool of corporate
governance. During the post-World War 11era, the United Kingdom has instituted no fewer
than five major reforms of the corporate tax system that can be traced back to the desire to
influence corporate behavior. See MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 5
(1977) (describing four of the five major reforms of the corporate tax system since the war);
SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO

FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 47-48 (1993) (concerning the United Kingdom's use of taxation
to influence corporate behavior). The fifth major change occurred in 1997 when the United
Kingdom ended its Advance Corporation Tax System. Steven A. Bank, The DividendDivide in
Anglo-American CorporateTaxation, 30 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2004).
3. William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations,158 N. AM. REv. 1,7(1894)
("The very limited public supervision incident to the assessment and collection of such a tax
would not work any wrong or any interference with their lawful operations, while as a necessary
part of a tax law, and used only for that bona-fide purpose, it might be salutary in its
influence."). Wilson was the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. Id. at 1.
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noted that one of the merits of the tax was "the federal supervision which must
be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and
business transactions of all corporations. '4 Federal taxation was a means to
preempt the traditional state role in the regulation of corporations without
actually establishing a system of federal incorporation.5
Despite its long history, the attempt to regulate corporations through the
tax system has had only mixed results. In many cases, Congress's corporate
governance-motivated tax reform efforts have failed miserably. This is not to
say that tax reform has failed to actually modify corporate behavior for at least a
brief time, although this may be the case in some instances. Rather, many of
the tax provisions introduced or enacted as part of a corporate governance
reform effort have simply failed, in the words of Mark Roe, to "survive" in the
face of fierce corporate resistance. 6 If they survived enactment and were not
technically repealed within a few years, they have been effectively rendered
useless or counterproductive,
and their continued existence has been the subject
7
of much criticism.
4. 44 CONG. REc. 3344 (1909) (message from President Taft). See also Marjorie E.
Komhauser, CorporateRegulationand the Originsofthe CorporateIncome Tax, 66 IND. L.J.
53, 99 (1990) (stating that Taft viewed the tax as a method of furthering his goal of corporate
regulation).
5. This is not to suggest that federal incorporation itself has never been considered.
Progressive-era reformers called for an explicit federal incorporation requirement in the face of
a perceived decline in state corporation laws, but such proposals were defeated. See MARTIN J.
SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 203-85
(1988) (concerning proposals for Sherman Act revision and the Hepburn bill); Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Comment, CorporatePrivilegesfor the Public Benefit: The ProgressiveFederal
IncorporationMovement and the Modern RegulatoryState, 77 VA. L. REV. 603,622-23 (1991)
(stating that reformers increasingly became advocates of a federal incorporation law). In large
part, the securities laws enacted in 1933 and 1934 served as a de facto federal corporations law.
See Robert B. Thompson & Hilary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 869 (2003) ("The government response to
the excesses of the 1920s and to the pain of the Great Depression again led to calls for federal
corporations law, but the New Deal Congress that passed securities litigation in 1933 and 1934
chose less intrusive means.").
6. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 118 (1994) ("But to survive, a proposal must not gore the ox of
a powerful interest group. The tax on undistributed profits threatened managers; within a few
years the tax was dead.").
7. See, e.g., Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role ofthe FederalTax Law in Regulating
Hostile CorporateTakeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail,40 U.
FLA. L. REV. 789, 792 (1988) (arguing that "the use of federal tax law to discourage greenmail
transactions violates tax policy goals, and such violations are not justified by this overly broad,
punitive statute"); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication:
Missing Factorsin Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. RV. 971, 974 (1992) (suggesting
that tax policy may be a significant contributor to stockholder abdication); Susan J. Stabile, Is
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Notwithstanding such criticism, recent observers suggest that in some
cases tax can be an effective ally in the fight to reform corporate governance.
David Schizer, for example, argues that a variety of tax rules have served as an
effective hindrance to executive hedging transactions.8 Reuven Avi-Yonah
goes further, arguing that the corporate tax and, by implication, corporate rates,
can be used "to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of
corporate management." 9 This normative conclusion draws support from recent
studies in the economics literature that demonstrate the corporate governance
benefits of strong tax enforcement by reducing the level of "managerial
diversion" of corporate assets.' 0 Given the existing political support and
academic controversy surrounding the use of tax as a tool of corporate
governance, the challenge is to more fully investigate whether some corporate
governance-motivated tax reforms may be better positioned to succeed than
others.
Perhaps the best prism through which to understand the use of taxation to
modify corporate behavior is the experience of the New Deal. Not only does it
have the advantage of historical distance, but the New Deal is also replete with
examples of corporate governance-oriented tax provisions. During a relatively
brief period of time, Congress embarked on an ambitious, but ultimately
unsuccessful, campaign to change corporate behavior through tax reform."
There a Rolefor Tax Law in PolicingExecutive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 81,9092 (1998) (stating that section 280G, aiming to make excessive parachute payments financially
prohibitive to a corporation, has limited effectiveness); David 1.Walker, Tax Incentives WillNot
Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 TAX NOTES 851 (2002) (arguing that tax incentives are
unlikely to result in full accounting for stock option expenses); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The
Market for Corporate Confusion: FederalAttempts to Regulate the Marketfor Corporate
Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAuL Bus. L.J. 159, 199 (1993) ("The strict
confines of the tax code do not lend themselves well to the implementation of social policy.").
8. See David Schizer, Executives and Hedging. The FragileLegal Foundation of
Incentive Compatibility,100 CoLuM. L. REv. 440, 446 (2000) (noting the corporate governance
benefits of certain tax barriers to executive hedging transactions).
9. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,Society and the State: A Defense of the
CorporateTax, _ VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 38, on file with author).
10. See Mihir Desai et al., The ProtectingHand: Taxation andCorporateGovernance2
(Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/Events/Papers/RPP_4-1703 Dyck.pdf (last visited June 27, 2004) (arguing that a higher tax rate increases the level of
diversion, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it).
1I.
See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., FACING THE
TAX PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF TAXATION INTHE UNITED STATES AND A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE
153-87 (1937) (surveying, in a chapter entitled "Control of Business Organization and
Practices," the New Deal program for the regulation of corporations through the tax laws)
[hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND]; MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM:
THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939, at 74-90 (1984) (concerning New Deal attempts to
limit executive compensation).
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Thus, between 1932 and 1936, legislators enacted or attempted to enact tax
provisions designed to restrict the growth of large corporations; 2 to eliminate
the holding company structure; 3 to lower the amount of executive
compensation; 14 to force the distribution of dividends; 5 and to minimize
mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations. 6 While some of these
corporate governance-motivated proposals were enacted amid only mild
17
opposition and remain a part of the Code to this day,
most were either rejected
8
years.'
few
a
immediately or were repealed within
As a case study on the use of tax provisions to regulate corporate
governance, this Article compares and contrasts two New Deal-era corporate
tax provisions-the proposed abolition and eventual overhaul of the tax-free
reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1934 and the enactment of an
undistributed profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1936-where managerial
resistance spelled the difference between success and failure. The proposal to
abolish or radically alter the reorganization provisions, which governed the tax
treatment of stock and property received in mergers, consolidations, and other
business combinations, aroused only limited managerial opposition and the
resulting provisions have survived virtually intact to this day. The
undistributed profits tax, on the other hand, was the target of a vigorous
12. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, §102(a), 49 Stat. 1014, 1015 (1935)
(providing for graduated marginal rates on corporations).
13. See id. § 102(h), 49 Stat. at 1016 (reducing the dividends received deduction from one
hundred to ninety percent); Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 141 (c), 47 Stat. 169,
213 (1932) (providing for an additional tax of three-quarters of one percent for filing a
consolidated return); National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L.No. 73-67, § 217(e), 48
Stat. 195, 209 (1934) (raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to one percent);
Revenue Act of 1934, § 141, 48 Stat. 680, 720-21 (1934) (raising the additional tax on
consolidated returns to two percent for railroad corporations and abolishing the right to file
consolidated returns for all other corporations); Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740,
§ 26(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1664 (1936) (reducing the dividends received deduction to eighty-five
percent).
14. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87-89 (describing serious proposals in 1932 and 1934 to
erect tax limits on executive salaries).
15. See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656 (1936)
(concerning the undistributed profits tax).
16. See infra notes 83-143 and accompanying text (discussing the tax-free reorganization
provision).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 368 (2000) (concerning the tax-free reorganization provision);
I.R.C. § 243 (2000) (concerning less than 100% exemption for dividends received by some
corporate shareholders); I.R.C. § 11 (2000) (concerning the graduated marginal rate on
corporations).
18. Examples of such rejection include the abolition of the consolidated return and the
imposition of an undistributed profits tax.
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lobbying campaign and was repealed after only a few years. Although both
provisions were at least partially justified on tax policy grounds, they had
significant and publicly acknowledged implications for corporate governance
and for- the independence of managers vis-i-vis their shareholders. In the
former case, eliminating or tightening the tax-free reorganization provisions as
part of an effort to restrict excessive business combinations potentially limited a
manager's ability to expand his business through acquisitions. In the latter
case, an undistributed profits tax designed to prevent corporate "hoarding" of
earnings and profits restricted the free cash flow managers counted on for
capital projects and cash acquisitions. Managerial opposition to both proposals
may reflect the problems associated with the shareholders' delegation of
authority to an agent-the manager-who is imbued with self-interest,' 9 but the
agency cost theory does not entirely explain the discrepancy in the degree of
opposition. The question is why managers reacted so differently to what appear
to be similar threats to managerial independence.
While changes in the underlying political and economic environment
played a role, this Article suggests that the divergent reactions can at least
partly be attributed to the extent to which each particular proposal threatened an
underlying norm of corporate behavior.20 In the case of reorganizations,
Congress sought to influence transactions that were already regulated by both a
corporation's by-laws and the laws of the state of incorporation. All major
acquisitions or sales were subject to unanimous shareholder approval in the
early years of the corporation; by 1934, at least majority approval was still
19.

For a general discussion of the agency cost problem in the economics and finance

literature, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
EcoN. REv. 650 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory ofthe Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am.ECON. REv. 323 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,

3J.FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
20. There has been a recent explosion of interest among corporate law scholars in the field
of norm theory. See generallySymposium: Norms & CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1607
(2001) (publishing papers from a symposium on norms and corporate law). The term "norms"
in this literature is generally intended to denote non-legally enforceable conventions of
behavior. But see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Introduction, Symposium: Norms

and CorporateLaw, 149 U.PA. L. REv. 1607, 1612-13 (2001) (suggesting that legal scholars

have used the term to refer to both legally and non-legally enforceable arrangements and
suggesting replacing the term norms with the phrase "nonlegally enforceable rules and
standards" to end the confusion). In the context of this article, however, the use of the term
norms is meant to convey non-tax law conventions governing the behavior of managers. Thus,
it may mean both non-legally enforceable norms of manager behavior, such as those dictated by
market expectations, as well as legally enforceable norms, such as judicial decisions or state and
federal corporate laws governing corporate activity and manager discretion.
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necessary. Moreover, federal antitrust laws served as an additional constraint
on merger activity. Thus, there was no norm supporting a manager's unfettered
discretion to engage in acquisitive transactions or to structure such transactions
in the manner most suitable to the manager's needs. By contrast, dividends had
always been a matter of discretion for a corporation's board of directors. While
shareholders could seek redress for an abuse of that discretion, directors were
given wide latitude. Under then-existing norms, it was considered prudent
business practice to retain between thirty and fifty cents of every dollar
earned. 2' Although some larger corporations already distributed in excess of
that amount and the undistributed profits tax as passed was designed to permit
corporations to retain a significant percentage of profits before the penalty tax
was imposed, businesses of all sizes were concerned about the threat to their
control over corporate finances. Therefore, while both provisions were
opposed in part because they were potentially adverse to manager interests, one
reason the undistributed profits tax was resisted much more strongly was
because it threatened the long-standing norm of managerial control over a
corporation's finances.
This corporate norms-based explanation of managerial resistance provides
valuable insights for the use of tax as a tool of corporate governance. The
implication is that tax measures may reinforce existing norms, but are less
likely to be successful in establishing new ones. This may explain the fact that
while most modem provisions have been nullified by managerial opposition,22
some have been more accepted and therefore effective.23 Analyzing the
underlying norms threatened may also help provide a more reasoned basis for
further use of the Code as a tool to regulate corporate governance. In Parts II
and III, this Article chronicles the development of the reorganization provision
and undistributed profits tax proposals, respectively, considering both their
legislative histories and the managerial resistance at each stage. In Part IV, this
21. See SERGEI DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RETENTION 1915-1943, at 13 (1951)
("During the expansion years of the twenties the notion was rather widespread that sound
financial policy required retention in the enterprise of 50 cents out of every dollar of net income.
In the late thirties some large corporations considered the retention of 30 percent of net income
an appropriate long-term policy.").
22. See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation,7 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 301, 332 (1995) (stating that the congressional attempt to
regulate the deductibility of executive compensation in I.R.C. § 162(m) ignores the derivatives
market and advances an avenue of tax avoidance); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute
Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REv. 125, 128 (2001) (stating that corporations have
created "clever avoidance schemes" around the golden parachute provisions).
23. See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466 (stating that "the most effective tax constraint on
exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options, which were not
fashioned with corporate governance in mind").
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Article explores the possible reasons why the two provisions took such
divergent paths. While acknowledging the political and economic changes
between 1934 and 1936, this Article focuses on a previously unexplored
phenomenon-the nature and status of the underlying corporate behavior each
proposal sought to regulate. This Article concludes by examining the possible
implications this analysis may have for modem attempts to use the Code to
influence corporate behavior.
HI. Tax-Free ReorganizationProvisions
A. EarlyHistory
The tax treatment of the participants to a merger, consolidation, or other
reorganization was an open question when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment
income tax was adopted in 1913.24 Shareholders claimed that the exchange of
stock in a business combination was a change in form rather than substance, but
nothing in the 1913 Act precluded their taxation. Treasury officials initially
appeared to side with shareholders,26 but soon issued regulations providing that
exchanges of property for stock might be taxable under certain circumstances.27
Congress eventually resolved the issue as part of a general compromise over the
timing of realization in property exchanges. 21 Under section 202(b) of the
24. See Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 1l(A), 38 Stat. 114, 166-67 (1913)
(levying tax on income).
25.

See

RANDOLPH

E.

PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION:

THIRD SERIES 8 (1940)

(suggesting that the regulations supported the possibility of taxing reorganizations); Homer
Hendricks, FederalIncome Tax: Definition of"Reorganization,"45 HARV. L. REv. 648,648
n. 1 (1931) (stating that although there were no special provisions in the Revenue Acts with
regard to gain or loss on corporate reorganizations, the Supreme Court commonly held that full
taxable gain was realized); Hugh Satterlee, The Income Tax Definition ofReorganization, 12

639, 639 (1934) (discussing history of taxation).
26. See GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 262 n.20 (1920)
("Where, upon a reorganization, new stock was acquired by a stockholder inexchange for the
old stock, and both were of the sameparvalue, no income arose at the time of the exchange, but
when the new stock was sold, the gain was required to be based upon the cost of the old stock,
or its value as of March 1, 1913.") (citing Letter from Treasury Dep't, Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S.
1918, par. 1302).
27. See T.D. 2690, 20Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 126, 187-88 (1918) (concerning tax on saleof
corporate assets).
28. The compromise was between proponents of the consumption and accretion models of
taxation. The accretion model suggested annual taxation of increases in value, while the
consumption model approved taxation only upon a sale in which the proceeds were not
reinvested. Shareholders claimed that the former option would work an injustice because any
gains realized were only "paper" gains, but Congress feared that the latter option would permit
TAX MAG.
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Revenue Act of 1918, reorganizations were deemed realization events, but any
gain or loss was deferred until a subsequent taxable sale. 29 Although this
established the principle of the tax-free reorganization, the provision was
flawed in several respects.3 Most notably, nonrecognition treatment was
limited to exchanges of stock having3 1equal par values, and the provision failed
to define the term "reorganization."
The deficiencies in the first reorganization provision greatly limited its
usefulness. As one practitioner later recalled, "[t]he 1918 provisions were
impracticable in operation; the then status of the law was such as to hamper
necessary business adjustments. 3 2 This problem did not escape Congress's
attention. In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in September
of 1921, Dr. T.S. Adams, an economic advisor to the Treasury Department,33
virtually indefinite deferral of taxation. The reorganization provisions struck a balance between
these two approaches by acknowledging the paper gain problem, while recognizing that most
types of property exchanges were taxable. See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, andHistorical
Realism, 75 TuL. L. REv. 1, 62-63 (2000) (describing the "realization compromise").
29. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919)
(concerning taxation of reorganizations). The Revenue Act of 1918 provides:
[Wihen in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a
corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new
stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be
deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities received shall
be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged.
Id.
30.

See Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive and DisregardedMergers,34 GA. L. REv. 1523,

1550-51 (2000) (discussing problems and ambiguities in the 1918 Act's reorganization
provision).
31. See id. (analyzing the 1918 Act's reorganization provision and its flaws). Treasury
attempted to address the latter flaw by issuing a regulation that outlined the types of transactions
that were eligible for nonrecognition treatment under Section 202(b). Under Treasury
Regulation Section 45, nonrecognition treatment was available for transactions "where two (or
more) corporations unite their properties by either (a) the dissolution of corporation B and the
sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B to A and the dissolution of
B, or (c) the sale of the stock of B to A and the dissolution of B, or (d)the merger of B into A,
or (e) the consolidation of the corporations." T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 395
(1919). This was consistent with the prevailing understanding of the term in the nonbankruptcy context. See Eric L. Kohler, Reorganizationsand the FederalIncome Tax Law, 4
NAT'L INCOME TAx MAO. 161, 161 (1926) ("The current use of the term is reflected in part by

the definition offered seventeen years ago by Thomas W. Lamont: 'a decision brought about
usually by a company's success, to enlarge it, to recapitalize. it, or to amalgamate it with some
other corporation or corporations."').
32. Hendricks, supra note 25, at 648 n.I.
33. Adams, a professor of political economy at Yale, is sometimes called the "father of the

1921 Act." Ronald H. Jensen, OfForm and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporationsand Other

TransactionsUnder Section 351, 11 VA. TAx REv. 349, 383 n.117 (1991) (citing Carlton Fox,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General in 1936, for having given Adams that title). Adams
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noted that "the principal defect of the present law is in blocking desirable
business readjustments. ''34 According to Adams, "[a]ll kinds of business
readjustments had been stopped" due to the fear of being subject to taxation,
and transaction activity would continue to stall without clarifying and
liberalizing the reorganization provisions.
In the context of a post-World War I economic downturn, the concerns
about a threat to business reorganizations were understandable. A sharp drop
in the artificially high wartime prices, especially in the agricultural sector,
ushered in an economic downturn between 1920 and 1922 that has been
referred to as "the last of the 'depressions' before the catastrophe of 1929
occurred."3 6 During 1921 alone, approximately 20,000 companies closed and
almost five million individuals were unemployed." A House Ways and Means
Committee Report remarked that "the exacting of the present excessive sums of
taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to the depressing
influences under which business and industry in general are staggering as an
aftermath of the World War. 3 8 The Committee explained that the financial
ravages of war are felt most acutely "after the cessation of hostilities, at which
time the demand for war supplies terminates, with a resulting shrinkage of
values. The Nation is now passing through the trying period of liquidation and
readjustment.
The reduction of the tax burdens is essential to business
39
recovery.

Furthermore, merger activity began to slow during this economic
downturn. Although the number and size of firms absorbed by merger
increased steadily in 1919 and 1920,40 "the pace of merger activity subsided
was the principal Treasury spokesperson before Congress on tax legislation and was considered

one of the foremost tax and public finance theorists of his day. See Michael J. Graetz &
Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent" of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021,
1029-30 (1997) (stating that Adams served as tax advisor to the Treasury Department from
1917 until 1923 and was the Treasury's spokesman before the House Ways and Means

Committee and Senate Finance Committee whenever tax legislation was being formulated).
34.

Hearingson H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921)

(statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, advisor to the Treasury Department).
35. Id.
36. CHARLES R. GEIssT, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 155 (1997); see also CHARLES A.
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, I AMERICA INMIDPASSAGE 28 (1939) (concerning the collapse of
war prices in 1921); PAUL, supra note 25, at 21 (stating that there was a depression in 1920);
Jensen, supranote 33, at 386 n.126 (stating that the country was experiencing a severe business
recession in 1921).
37. Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n. 126.
38. H.R. REP. No. 350 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. 168.
39. Id.
40.

See RALPH L. NELSON,

MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY

1895-1956, at
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somewhat in the depression of 1921.' It did not truly resume its upward slope
after this interruption until the mid-1920s.42 Sheldon Cohen, a former
commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, concluded that "[i]n this
historical context it is not at all surprising that preferential treatment was
accorded corporate mergers and consolidations on the assumption that the
provisions would" encourage business reorganizations.43
Thus, in the Revenue Act of 1921,44 Congress amended the reorganization
provision to address some of business's concerns. Under section 202(c)(2) of
the 1921 Act, "reorganization" was defined to include:
[A] merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation
of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or of
substantially all the properties of another corporation), recapitalization, or
mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization of a corporation
46
(however effected).
While this definition was itself flawed because it failed to specify the
permissible consideration in such transactions,47 from the perspective of
business it was a vast improvement over the 1918 version. As both the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees emphasized in their
respective reports on the 1921 Act, the revised reorganization provision "will,

37 tbl. 14 (detailing the frequency and size of mergers).
41. J. KEITH BUTTERS ET AL., EFFECTS OF TAXATION:
42.

CORPORATE MERGERS

292 (195 1).

See JOHN M. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC

POLICY 264 (1972) (concerning the second wave of mergers in the mid-1920s).
43. Sheldon S. Cohen, ConglomerateMergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A. J. 40,41 (1969).

The 1921 decision to create a better environment for mergers and acquisitions should be
distinguished from the 1918 decision to provide nonrecognition treatment for reorganizations,
which was based on the realization compromise between consumption and accretion tax visions
of the income tax system. See Bank, supra note 28, at 28-34 (stating that in 1918, Congress did
not concern itself with creating an environment designed to encourage mergers because of the
high rate of mergers in the era immediately after World War 1).
44. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
45. During the debates on a proposed amendment to the reorganization provision, one
Senator noted that "when so much reorganization is going on in the business world, it is thought
by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries of the country at this time that this is a
very helpful provision." 61 CONG. REC. S6563 (Oct. 21, 1921) (statement of Sen. Watson)
(regarding the removal of a provision requiring stock to be of equal par value to qualify for
nonrecognition treatment).
46. Revenue Act of 1921 § 202(c)(2) (1921).
47. One commentator referred to this omission as a "blunder of draftsmanship." Valentine
Brookes, The Continuityof Interest Test in Reorganizations-ABlessing or a Curse, 34 CAL. L.
REV. 1,5-6 (1946).
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by removing a source of grave uncertainty ... permit business
to go forward
48
with the readjustments required by existing conditions.,
The liberalization of the reorganization provisions continued in subsequent
revenue acts. 49 The Revenue Act of 1924 expanded the definition of
reorganization to include spin-offs and split-offs.50 One member of the House
Ways and Means Committee explained to Congress that this amendment was
inserted "to include other usual forms of corporate reorganization in the
advance of business, such as the splitting of one corporation into two or more
corporations, which I may say under the present law would not be permitted
except by forming two entirely new corporations. "' The 1924 Act also
formally extended the exemption from taxation to corporations so that they
received the benefit of nonrecognition of any gain.12 Although a Treasury
interpretation had concluded that corporations were exempt under the 1921
Act, the Senate Finance Committee explained that "[t]he present ruling of the
Treasury Department on this question is of doubtful legality and a statutory
provision is most necessary."0 3 This expansion was designed to further remove
48. H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 168, 176; S. REP. No.
67-275, at 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 181, 189.
49. See Roswell Magill, Effect of Taxation on Corporate Policies, 72 U.S. L. REV. 637,
639 (1938) ("[I]n the early twenties, Congress regarded business reorganizations as frequently
desirable and often necessary. Hence, successive revenue laws contained increasingly liberal
provisions, to permit corporations and stockholders to carry through tax-free, not only the kinds
of reorganizations which the Supreme Court had passed upon, but a number of other kinds.");
Income Tax on Corporate Reorganization, 2 N.Y. L. REv. 387, 390 (1924) ("The present
statute, as well as that of 1921, was obviously designed to promulgate a policy more liberal to
the taxpayer.").
50. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(h)(1),43 Stat. 253,257 (1924)
(defining "reorganization," in part, as "a transfer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to
another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are
in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred"). A "spin-off' involves a
contribution by a corporation of some or all of its assets to another corporation, followed by a
distribution of the stock of that corporation to all of the first corporation's existing shareholders
as a dividend. A "split-off' is the same transaction as a spin-off except instead of distributing
the new corporation's stock as a dividend, the stock is distributed to certain of the first
corporation's shareholders in exchange for their stock in the original corporation. The result is
two separate corporations with two separate groups of shareholders. See 2 MARTIN D.
GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS para. 1001 (2003)
(concerning spin-offs).
51. 65 CONG. REc. H2429 (Feb. 14, 1914) (statement of Rep. Green).
52. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203 (b)(3),43 Stat. 253, 256 (1924)
("No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges
property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another
corporation a party to the reorganization.").
53. S. REP. No. 398 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 276. See also Milton Sandberg,
The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations",38 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 102-03 (1938) ("In the
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any limits placed on business readjustments by the tax law. The House Ways
and Means Committee explained that nonrecognition treatment was granted in
order to permit "ordinary business transactions" to go forward free from tax
constraints and "[i]f it is necessary for this reason to exempt from tax the gain
realized by the stockholders, it is even more necessary to exempt from tax the
gain realized by the corporation.0 4 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
1924 Act refined the definition of reorganization to make it exclusive for tax
purposes.55 This helped to provide the certainty businesses sought before
engaging in reorganizations.
There were two problems with the liberalization of the reorganization
provisions. First, it may have worked too well in encouraging businesses to
combine. One practitioner noted that reorganizations became "almost, if not
actually, a fetish with many business men and certain short-sighted, so-called
tax counselors. 5 6 This trend contributed to a marked increase in business
combinations. Of the 92 active holding companies whose stock was listed on
the New York Stock Exchange in 1928, 66 had been granted charters since
1910 and, of those companies, at least 34 had received their charters between
1923 and 1928." Furthermore, during 1928 and 1929, mergers were occurring
at a far more rapid pace than at the beginning of the decade or at any time
during the more famous merger movement at the turn-of-the-century. 8 Of the
8500 acquisitions of formerly independent manufacturing and mining
businesses between the end of World War I and the end of 1931, more than
4800 occurred between 1926 and 1930, and almost 2300 disappeared in 1928
and 1929 alone. 9
Economic concentration accompanied this revived period of merger and
consolidation. Between 1922 and 1929, there were eight mergers valued at
over $100 million and at least fourteen transactions in which the target

Mellon Bill of 1924, the statutes were amended to enact into law a Treasury interpretation of the
1921 Act which was both clearly erroneous and highly advantageous to taxpayer interests."). A
regulation promulgated under the 1921 Act had construed the reorganization provisions so as to
exempt corporations as well as their shareholders. See T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 207,
499-500 (1922) (concerning determination of gain or loss on exchange of property).
54. H.R. REP. No. 179 (1924), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. at 250.
55. The 1924 Act replaced the phrase "the word 'reorganization' includes ... ," with the
phrase "the word 'reorganization' means."
Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(h)(1).
56. Kohler, supra note 3l, at 180.
57. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 206 n. 18 (1932).
58. BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 292.
59. Id.
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corporation had assets valued at over $50 million. 6° By 1932, Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means reported that "perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth ofthe
country [has passed] from individual ownership to ownership by large,
publicly-financed corporations." 61 In his famous dissent in the Louis K. Liggett
case, Justice Brandeis described the extent of this economic concentration:
"200 nonbanking corporations, each with assets in excess of $90,000,000,
control directly about one-fourth of all our national wealth. ' 62 One study
concluded that "the merger movement of the 1920s not only significantly
increased over-all levels of concentration
but did so to a substantial extent" in
63
certain key industry groups.
After the stock market crash in October of 1929, there was a tendency to
place at least part of the blame for the ensuing economic crisis on the
"excessive" business combinations and resulting economic concentration of the
1920s. 64 As Paul Conkin reports, this blame was probably misplaced:
"Numerous corporate consolidations increased efficiency even as they narrowed
participation in key managerial choices. ' 6' The broad impact of the crash,
however, made the reality irrelevant for a Congress seeking to blunt its bitter
effects: "The statutes which 'permitted necessary business adjustments' in
1921" became, from the post-Crash perspective of the 1930s, "one of the major
and indispensable forces in the
thrust towards economic concentration which
66
characterized the 'twenties. ,
Second, the liberalized reorganization provisions opened the door to
reorganizations motivated primarily by a desire to reduce taxes. This
movement was primarily due to poor drafting-the reorganization provisions
were overly detailed and yet still ambiguous in important ways. Although the
Revenue Act of 1921 included what legislators thought to be "comprehensive"
reorganization provisions, taxpayers soon took advantage of the many
deficiencies and gaps in drafting.67 After extensive study, Congress
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 294.
note 57, at vii.
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 566 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
BUTrERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 299 (citing industry groups such as oil, steel, and
BERLE & MEANS, supra

copper).
64. See Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Other
writers have shown that, coincident with the growth of these giant corporations, there has
occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth; and that the resulting disparity in
incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.").
65. PAUL K. CoNX]N, THE NEW DEAL 23 (2d ed. 1975).
66. Sandberg, supra note 53, at 125.
67. PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
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concluded in 1924 that the relatively sparse reorganization provisions
should be greatly expanded to specify the exact nature of each requirement
for qualification under the statute.68 The resulting revenue act was called
one of "the most detailed and precise statutes which had been evolved up to
that time., 69 Randolph Paul remarked that the reorganization provisions
"on their face appeared sufficient to capture the most elusive quarry."7
The detail of the reorganization provisions proved a mirage for those
eager to stop abuse. Creative tax practitioners located loopholes in even
the most explicit of clauses and openly devised transactions that complied
with the letter, if not the spirit, of the statute. One practitioner described
the wide variety of reorganizations that were used to reduce taxable
income:
New corporations were established out of old with the assurance of

larger deductions for depreciation; corporations on the verge of
liquidation were reorganized so that earned surplus and surplus to be
earned upon dissolution might be absorbed in larger issues of stock,
and then dissolved without taxable profit except possibly to
stockholders. Elaborate projects were evolved whereby surplus cash
was to be passed on to stockholders as a partial "liquidation" of their
shares. Common law trusts were established by the score. 71

While the courts helped shut down a number of the schemes occasioned by
loopholes and overly tight drafting, 72 taxpayers won a fair number of the
cases and even more probably went undetected.73

68. Id. See also Satterlee, supra note 25, at 640 (stating that 1924 Act included an
elaborate definition of corporate reorganization).
69. Brookes, supra note 47, at 5. An explanation of the proposed changes from the
Revenue Act of 1921 consumed almost two full pages of the New York Times. TreasuryExpert
Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1924, at 1. Authored by A.W. Gregg, a special assistant
to the Secretary of the Treasury, the "Gregg Statement," as it came to be known, became a
symbol for a style of drafting that favored leaving nothing unsaid. Satterlee, supra note 25, at
640.
70. PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
71. Kohler, supranote 31, at 180. See Emestine Breisch, Usingthe Stepped-Up Basis on
Corporate Reorganizations, 9 TAx MAG. 245, 245 (1931) (describing the possibility of
acquiring cost rather than carryover basis in a reorganization).
72. See Steven A. Bank, Federalizingthe Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End to the
Anachronistic Reliance on State CorporationLaws, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1307, 1336-39 (1999)
(describing cases).
73. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 37 (stating that "defeat piled upon defeat" for Treasury).
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B. New Deal
1. Subcommittee Proposal
As Roosevelt settled into the presidency in 1933, Congress was in the
process of investigating the causes of the stock market crash and Great
Depression. During the highly publicized Pecora hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,7 4 named after Ferdinand
Pecora, the aggressive lead counsel for the Committee,75 there were
allegations of widespread misconduct and questionable actions by
investment bankers and corporate managers. Some of these accusations
related to the disabling of typical corporate governance mechanisms in
connection with mergers and acquisitions. In one device, the Pennsylvania
Railroad financed a holding company by issuing "voting trust certificates"
rather than stock so it could amass the financial resources to engage in
strategic acquisitions of smaller railroad lines without being subject to
stockholder oversight.76 An investment banker involved in organizing the
Pennsylvania Railroad holding company candidly testified that all such
' 77
efforts to deprive stockholders of control were "inventions of the devil.
Other corporate governance practices highlighted during the Pecora
hearings related to the impropriety of executive compensation or dividend
declarations. With respect to the former issue, several Senators grilled
Albert Wiggin, the former chairman of the board of directors at Chase
National Bank, about the size and source of his income, noting that "[t]hey
credited you with being responsible for some of their added profits in the
good years" by paying large bonuses, but "[i]n bad years [they failed to]
charge you in any way with responsibility for losses., 78 As Wiggin later
conceded under questioning, he alone determined his bonus, and the board
served as little more than a rubber stamp.79 With respect to the latter issue,
74. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84, 73d Cong. 2319-25 (1933) [hereinafter Pecora Hearings].
75. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 58-59 (referring to Ferdinand Pecora as the "unrelenting
committee counsel"); ROE, supranote 6, at I10-11 (concerning the Pecora hearings); The Man
Who Will Question Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1933, § 8, at 2 (profiling Ferdinand Pecora).

76.

See

FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH

58-59 (1939) (detailing the

structure of the holding company organized by Pennsylvania Railroad).
77. Id. at 59 (quoting Otto Kahn, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company).
78. Pecora Hearings, supra note 74, at 2319-25 (statement of Senator Adams).
79. See id. at 2337 (statement of Albert Wiggin) ("I think I made up that list with my
name on it and the board always approved it."). When he later conceded that he had suggested
his $100,000 retirement pay, "he unleashed a furious reaction from public and stockholder alike
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Pecora questioned the director of Fox Film Corporation over its declaration
of a $4 million dividend to its principal stockholder, the General Theaters
Equipment, in a year when it sustained a loss of more than $5.5 million.80
Senator Couzens noted that this action was particularly suspicious given the
"very close affiliation between the General Theaters Equipment and the
management of the Fox Film Corporation" and the fact that Fox was heavily in
debt at the time.8' While it is not entirely clear that the practice in either case
was improper, the investigation into these cases and other similar incidents
indicated Congress's heightened concern over the internal governance of the
corporation.
This inquiry into Wall Street's contribution to the stock market crash and
the ensuing Depression was accompanied by revelations of rampant tax
evasion. According to one account, not only had the world-renowned financier
J.P. Morgan paid no income taxes during 1931 and 1932, none of the partners
in his investment house had either.8 2 While much of this behavior was
perfectly legal, 3 Congress was looking for scapegoats and the richer the better.
Thus, against the backdrop of an investigation that "had whipped up public
outrage against corporate abuses,"' 4 the House authorized a thorough study of
the internal revenue system in order to ferret out evasion and simplify the tax
laws.85

(which soon forced him to decline the pension)." LEF, supra note 1I,at 84.
80. See Pecora Hearings, supra note 74, at 3812 (questioning Hermann G.Place). Pecora
raised the same issue in his questioning of John Stalker, the president of the Union Guard Trust
Company, about the corporation's decision to declare adividend when it was not supported by
earnings and when economic conditions did not justify it. Id. at 4407.
81. Id. at 3813.
82. PECORA, supra note 76, at 190. Pecora further notes that Otto Kahn of Kuhn, Loeb
and Company "paid no income tax at all" during the years 1930, 1931, and 1932. Id.
83. See LEFF, supra note 1I,at 59 (suggesting the tax consequences were the result of
capital loss carryforwards); PECORA, supra note 76, at 192-93 (describing a common scheme
where taxpayers would sell stocks with built-in losses to members of their own families and then
buy them back after thirty days).
84. LEFF, supra note 11, at 85 (discussing the outcry against excessive executive salaries).
According to Ellis Hawley, the hearings "began to familiarize the public with a variety of
sensational abuses, with speculative pools, preferred lists, corporate pyramiding, insider deals,
and numerous devices for unloading worthless securities upon unsuspecting purchasers." ELLs
W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 306 (1966).
85. H.R. Res. 183, 73d Cong. (1933); 77 CONG.REc. H5701 (June 10, 1933) (debating
House Resolution 183); see also 78 CONG. REC. H2794 (Feb. 19, 1934) (statement of Rep.
Martin) ("This bill (the House bill proposed as a result of the study of the internal revenue
system) grew out of disclosures before the Senate Banking Committee by the money kings of
America, that for years they had not contributed one dollar to the support of this Government.").
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The resulting House Subcommittee report, issued in December of 1933,
reflected these dual themes of tax avoidance and corporate excesses.8 6 At the
press conference to announce the release of the Subcommittee report, the New
York Times observed that the "[c]hanges sought are aimed principally at
persons whose incomes are in the higher brackets, as well as at corporations
now legally permitted to take advantage of what committee members said were
'unfair but legal' provisions of the revenue laws., 8 7 One such apparently
"unfair but legal" revenue law was the tax-free reorganization provisions. In its
report, the Subcommittee recommended eliminating the tax-free reorganization
in order to "close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax
avoidance."88 Although nonrecognition treatment was premised on the
principle that tax is deferred rather than exempted, the report noted that "the
taxpayer is able to escape tax on these gains entirely by being permitted to elect
the year in which he shall report such gain."89
While the Subcommittee's report prominently cited the tax avoidance
rationale, 90 it also disclosed an underlying corporate governance motivation for
its recommendation. In a separate memorandum attached to the report, the
Subcommittee provided more detailed justification for repeal of the tax-free
reorganization provisions. 9' It acknowledged that one of the rationales for
liberalizing the reorganization provisions during the early 1920s was to remove
the obstacles to "normal business readjustments" but concluded that this
rationale was no longer salient.9 2 "[T]he present provisions," the report
observed, "have encouraged the injection into business structure of an unsavory
stimulus, such as the organization of large holding companies and the
overcapitalization of business."9 3 In effect, the Subcommittee report endorsed
86. See generally SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D
SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE (Comm. Print 1933)

(concerning the subcommittee report) [hereinafter 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
87. Tax PlanOffered to Curb Evasions,Raise $237,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1933, at
1.
88. 1933 SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 86, at 8.
89. Id.
90. See id.at 39-42 (providing eight hypothetical cases in which the reorganization
provisions were then used to avoid taxes).
91. See id. at 37, exh. D (concerning the "Memorandum on Exchanges and
Reorganizations").
92. Id. at 38. The rationale for the 1921 reforms has led at least one modern observer to
conclude that the tax-free reorganization provisions are one "ofthe best examples ofthe Code's
attempt not to let tax rules influence corporate governance." Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregation
and Subchapter C: Rethinking CorporateTax Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 655, 677 (1990). This
analysis, however, ignores the corporate governance motivation for the later 1934 reforms.
93. 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 86, at 39.
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withdrawing the reorganization provisions as a means of stemming the tide of
business combination and economic concentration.
The characterization of the reorganization provisions as an "unsavory
stimulus" to the creation of holding companies was part of a general attack on
such forms of corporate organization. One of the Subcommittee's many
recommendations was to eliminate the provisions permitting an affiliated group
of corporations to file a consolidated federal income tax return.94 As the report
acknowledged, 95 this recommendation was the culmination of a continuing
controversy in Congress over consolidated returns and the dangers of holding
companies. Holding companies, or corporations whose assets consisted of the
stock of subsidiary corporations, were often considered vehicles for the
predatory activities of trusts and chain stores. 96 In 1932, after rejecting a
similar proposal to abolish the consolidated return,97 Congress levied a small
tax on the privilege of filing as a consolidated group. 98 According to the
Subcommittee, however, this surcharge was no longer sufficient to offset the
tax advantages provided to corporate families under the consolidated return
provisions:
In the past, when any corporation could carry forward a net loss from one
year to another, the consolidated group did not have such a great advantage
over the separate corporation. Now that this net-loss carry-over has been
denied, the advantage
of the consolidated return is much greater on a
99
comparative basis.
Thus, the Subcommittee proposal to eliminate the consolidated return, like the
proposal to abolish the tax-free reorganization, was an attack on the holding
company system.' 0
At the subsequent House Ways and Means Committee hearings, corporate
managers opposed the Subcommittee's recommendations,' 0' but they were
94.
95.

Id. at 10.
Id.

96. See 75 CONG. REc. H7125 (Mar. 30, 1932) (statement of Rep. Cannon) (suggesting
that the consolidated return allows holding companies to reduce prices and undercut the
competition in one location while allowing any tax losses suffered to be used to offset income
from other more profitable locations).
97. See 1933 SUBCOMMirEE REPORT, supra note 86, at 10 (concerning Congressional
rejection of the proposal).
98. Id. The National Industrial Recovery Act subsequently increased this rate. See id.
(concerning the increase in the tax rate).
99. Id.
100.

Cf Tax Bill Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38

(characterizing Senator Borah's attempt to revive the original Subcommittee consolidated return
proposal inthe Senate as an effort "to strike at the holding company system").
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noticeably muted in their reaction to the proposal to abolish the reorganization
provisions. James Emery of the National Association of Manufacturers
generically pleaded:
We venture particularly at this time the suggestion that the national tax
policy, for the most practical reasons, should encourage new investment
rather than discourage it by radical change. The development of new or the
expansion of existing forms of business means a new or enlarged
contribution to the shrunken public purse.
Although this statement could be construed as an indictment of the proposal to
eliminate the tax-free reorganization provisions, Emery made no mention of
this proposal. 0 3 Only the U.S. Chamber of Commerce specifically opposed the
proposal to eliminate the reorganization provisions. It noted that:
Exchanges, modifications of capital structure and consolidations
undertaken in the interest of better operating conditions and as a means of
expanding business activity should not be penalized but should be
encouraged. This is especially true at the present time when many
reorganizations are unescapable as a result of the depression.
Reorganizations which are necessary to business recovery and increased
employment
1 4 will not be undertaken if an immediate tax liability is
imposed.

0

Even this expression of opposition, however, was a part of a prepared statement
submitted in lieu of live testimony. 0 5 No speaker
actually devoted any of his
06
allotted time to the reorganization proposal.
Part of the silence on the reorganization provisions may have been due to
the fact that Treasury was already doing most of the heavy labor in opposing
101. See generally Opposes Taxation as Social Cure-All, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24,1933, at 15
(concerning a hearing at which the proposal was under attack for seven hours); Railroads
Oppose Income Tax Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1933, at 5 (concerning statement submitted
to the Committee by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
102. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 215 (1933)
(statement of James A. Emery, Taxation Committee of the National Association of
Manufacturers) [hereinafter 1933 House Hearings].
103. See id. (providing no mention of the tax-free reorganization provision).
104. Id. at 290-91 (statement of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
105. Id. at 287. Chester Leasure appeared on behalf of the Chamber because Fred Clausen,
the Chamber's chief lobbyist on tax issues, was unable to attend. Id. The written statement was
subsequently republished in edited form in the New York Times. See Opposes Taxation as
Social Cure-All, supra note 101, at 15 (publishing Clausen's statement).
106. Because witnesses had a limited time to speak before the Committee, they presumably
chose the most important issues to highlight during live testimony and reserved lesser issues for
a written statement submitted sometime later.
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the Subcommittee recommendations. 0 7 Acting Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau issued a statement regarding the Subcommittee report at the start
of the Ways and Means hearings. 0 8 Morgenthau agreed with the
Subcommittee that the reorganization provisions were both complex and "open
to the serious objection of being overspecific,"'1 9 but concluded that the
provisions should be "completely redrafted" rather than abandoned entirely."0
Treasury believed that the elimination of the reorganization provisions would
simply afford taxpayers an opportunity to claim losses, both immediately and
over time in the form of higher bases for depreciation and depletion deductions,
with the result that "the proposal would not only yield no additional revenue,
but would result in a net loss.""' While corporate managers did not reference
the Treasury statement in supporting their own testimony, it may have allowed
them to focus on those recommendations the Treasury did not choose to
contest.
The problem with this explanation is that business leaders questioned a
number of the Subcommittee recommendations that the Treasury had already
rejected in its own statement. For instance, the Treasury concluded that the
Subcommittee proposal to abolish consolidated returns "might well be' a2
backward step, which would result in little, if any, additional revenue." "
According to the Treasury, full recognition of intercompany transactions would
be just as likely to result in deductible losses as gains and would incur
considerable administrative expenses for both the government and the
taxpayer." 3 This strong repudiation of the Subcommittee recommendation,
however, did not prevent a number of witnesses from raising the consolidated
107.

The Treasury was apparently upset at its minimal role inthe preparation of the

Subcommittee report. See LEFF, supra note 11, at 61 (quoting a business commentator as
stating that Treasury's role amounted to "practically nothing").
108. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY REGARDING THE
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVETO
METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS
TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF, 73D CONG.,
I (Comm. Print 1933) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY].
See also Treasury Would Alter All Taxes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1933, at I (concerning
statement of Henry Morgenthau).
109. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 108, at 9.

110. Id. at 9-10.
111. Id. at 10. This argument was not as persuasive after Congress adopted limits on the
ability to recognize capital losses in the Revenue Act of 1934 and thereby greatly reduced the
ability to use a taxable reorganization as an avenue for recognizing losses. Sandberg, supra
note 53, at 121.
112. STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 108, at 13.
113. Id.
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return issue in their own testimony.
The National Association of
Manufacturers noted that the consolidated return "merely recognizes the
separate corporate entities which are working parts of one business created
for convenience and necessity, developed out of experience, and recognized
by the States of the Union.'0 1 4 Similarly, M.L. Seidman of the New York
Board of Trade protested that "[t]o shut one's eyes to the position of a
particular company in a group, and to insist that every corporation in that
group file separate returns, would be to encourage artificial business
arrangements and to distort normal and natural intercompany accounting
methods." 5

2. House
Despite the lack of public protest from business leaders and
Subcommittee
Chairman
Hill's confident predictions that its
recommendations would prevail,' 1 6 the full House Ways and Means
Committee sided with the Treasury on the reorganization question. In its
report submitted in February of 1934, the Committee stated that "under
present conditions, the wiser policy is to amend the provisions drastically to
stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to eliminate the sections
completely. This decision will further avoid the period of litigation and
uncertainty which would necessarily follow a complete reversal of the
established policy."" 7
This apparent victory for corporate managers did not mean that the
Committee sought to continue encouraging reorganizations. In fact, under
the Committee's proposal, the number of transactions in which
reorganization status was available would be severely limited to "(1) statutory
mergers and consolidations; (2) transfers to a controlled corporation,
'control' being defined as an 80 per cent ownership; and (3) changes in the

114. 1933 House Hearings, supranote 102, at 215 (statement ofJames A.Emery, Taxation
Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers).
115. Id. at 173 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade). See also id. at
290 (statement of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Taxation, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States) ("Elimination of consolidated returns would undoubtedly force
corporate mergers and consolidations solely for the purpose of avoiding an unfair tax. Mergers
should be consummated only for the economic reason of increasing business efficiency.").
116. See Stands by Committee, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 17, 1933, at 2 (quoting the Chairman that
he did not expect significant changes as a result of Treasury's findings).
117. H.R. REP.No. 73-704, at 13 (1934), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564.
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capital structure or form of organization."' 18 According to its report, "the
definition of reorganization has been restricted so that the definition will
conform more closely to the general requirements of corporation law." 19
This admittedly "drastic" amendment to the reorganization provisions
once again provoked little protest on the part of corporate managers. 120 In the
House, this lack of protest was partly because the Ways and Means
Committee pushed for the passage of a special rule prohibiting all
amendments other than those offered by members of the Committee.' 2'
According to Representative Robert Doughton, the Chair of the Committee,
"[i]t is the only practical way to bring out the bill ....It is a good bill, and if
122
it is opened to amendments it won't be as good when passed as it now is."'
The apparent rationale for the rule was to block any amendments seeking to
scrap the whole income tax in favor of a sales tax, 23 but the practical result
was to secure passage of the bill with little debate on the floor of the House
24
and shift protest on individual proposals to the Senate. 1

118.
119.
120.

Id. at 14, reprinted in1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564.
Id.
See id.
(calling the amendment "drastic").
121. See ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 356 (1940)
(describing the rule limiting debate and amendments to those amendments proposed by the
House Committee on Ways and Means); House Rule isWon to Speed Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1934, at 1 (discussing the rule only allowing authors to propose amendments).
122. House Rule isWon to Speed Tax Bill, supra note 121, at 1.
123. See $65,000,000 isCut From New Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1934, at 7
(concerning the rule blocking amendments to the bill). The article stated:
Under such procedure agreed upon [requesting a rule to limit amendments and
debate], the only opportunity for a vote on a sales tax would be on a motion to send
the whole bill back to the committee with instructions to insert that levy. Since
only one motion to recommit will be proposed in the rule, it is not a certainty that a
vote will be afforded on the sales tax levy at all.
Id.; see also ManufacturersAssociation Urges Sales Tax and Flexible Liquor Levy at House
Hearing,WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1933, at I (describing the growing impetus for a sales tax).
124. The bill passed by a vote of 390-7. See 78 CONG. REc. H3005 (1934) (voting on the
bill). See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 356 (discussing the House debate). The
Blakeys write:
There was less discussion of the fundamental income tax sections than on any
similar occasion. The few speeches made were in explanation of the changes.
Perhaps the amendments were of such technical nature that they were not readily
understood. Perhaps the members thought it futile to debate in view of the stress
that had been placed on the profound study made by the subcommittee. Certainly,
after the passage of the gag rule, there was no point in offering amendments.
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3. Senate
Passage of the House bill did stir corporate managers to protest, but the
protest was still relatively limited. While the bill headed to the Senate
Finance Committee, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce once again issued a
statement decrying the proposed changes, including those changes to the
reorganization provision. This statement, however, was only a slightly revised
version of the one it submitted during the Ways and Means Committee
hearings. According to the Chamber, "[n]o tax should be imposed on
exchanges or reorganizations unless there is a clearly realized gain.
Reorganization and mergers made necessary, in view of economic conditions,
as a matter of good business policy, should not be discouraged or precluded
by additional taxation."' 125 The Chamber allowed for some possibility of
minor changes, but argued against anything more radical: "The question of
mergers and reorganizations in relation to Federal income taxes has always
been a complex one. The present provisions have been in the law practically
unchanged since 1918 and taken as a whole are126sound. Any substantial
change will result in confusion and uncertainty."'
Corporate managers issued similar statements of opposition to the House
bill's proposed treatment of reorganization provisions during the Senate
Finance Committee Hearings. As in the House hearings, however, few
witnesses addressed the issue, and most of those who did only did so in their
written statements. 27 The one exception was David Gaskill speaking on behalf
of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce. 28 While he discussed a proposed
limit on the deductibility of capital losses first, 29 he did raise the reorganization
provision in his testimony. Gaskill stated that:
The bill, as passed by the House, took out the so-called "parenthetical
clause," and limits the definition to statutory mergers and consolidations.
We take the position that with that eliminated, the bill is now indefinite, and

125.
126.
127.

Tax Bill Attacked as Business Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1934, at 21.
Id.
As in the House, speakers were asked to limit their presentations and submit as much

as possible in a written statement. See Hearingson H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on

Fin., 73d Cong. I (1934) (statement of Chairman Pat Harrison) (asking witnesses to be brief).
Thus, issues presented in live testimony were likely to be deemed more important than those
only presented in a written statement.
128. Id. (statement of David Gaskill).
129. See id. at 1-2 (discussing capital gains tax).
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a substantial amount of litigation will be necessary in order to find out just
what is and what is not a statutory consolidation or merger.130

As Senator Harrison appeared to recognize when he questioned Gaskill
about his claims,13 ' and the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce implied in its
written statement,132 the predicted litigation would most likely result from
managers' attempts to characterize stock and asset acquisitions-previously
parenthetical clause transactions-as statutory mergers and consolidations.
Aside from the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, no other party
addressed the reorganization provision in their testimony. The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce submitted both a prepared brief and report in which the House's
reorganization provision was criticized, but much of this criticism was
essentially a repeat of the objections raised by the Cleveland Chamber of
Commerce. In its brief, the Chamber warned that "[t]he provision affecting
mergers or consolidations of corporations will result in confusion, and will
discourage mergers which, in the view of recent economic conditions should be
made in the interests of good business policies, and because of the lessened
number of mergers, revenues will probably decrease." 33 Its accompanying
report elaborated on such concerns, emphasizing the view that the House
proposal would severely limit the tax-free reorganization: "The apparent effect
of this amendment will be to eliminate perhaps the most usual and important
form of reorganization, leaving only comparatively restricted and technical
forms permissible without tax." 34 According to the Chamber's report, the
cause of the confusion would be that the meanings of the terms "merger" and
"consolidation" would:
[H]ave to be determined in various instances by the laws of the particular
State which might be applicable in the case. What would be a merger or
consolidation in one State might not be in another. Instead, then, of having

130.

Id. at 2-3.

131. See id. at 3 (statement of Chairman Pat Harrison) (asking if the witness did not think
the provision simplifies any proportion of reorganization tax).
132. See id. at 7 (written statement of the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce) (arguing that
"the changes proposed will prevent the consummation of transactions which are entirely proper
and which are in fact necessary and advisable during a period of reconstruction"). The
Cleveland Chamber of Commerce also stated that "[t]he prevention of such transactions does
not produce any revenue for the Government and creates unreasonable interference with the
proper transaction of legitimate business." Id.
133. Id. at 50 (brief of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of Special Committee on Federal Taxation,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
134. Id. at 58 (report of the Committee of Federal Taxation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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uniform principles generally applicable to all corporations there would be
different standards applicable to different corporations.'13
This latter argument proved to be convincing to the Senate Finance
Committee-or at least it sounded reasonable enough to use as its official
justification for the rejection of the House's more radical amendments. In its
report, the Senate Finance Committee noted that it was "in complete agreement
with the purposes of the House Bill," but indicated that "some modifications are
recommended in order to bring about a more uniform application of the
provisions in all 48 of the States. Not all of the States have adopted statutes
providing for mergers or consolidations; and, moreover, a corporation of one
State can not ordinarily merge with a corporation of another State." 136 Because
"some legitimate and desirable business readjustments would be prevented" by
limiting nonrecognition treatment to statutory mergers, the Finance Committee
proposed a broader definition of "reorganization."' 137 Thus, in addition to the
statutory merger or consolidation and other transactions proposed under the
House bill, the Senate Finance Committee proposed to include the following
transaction within the definition of reorganization:
[T]he acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or part of its
voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80
per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of
another corporation;
or of substantially all the properties of another
3
corporation.-

8

The Committee noted that "these transactions, when carried out as prescribed in
this amendment, are in themselves sufficiently similar
to mergers and
39
consolidations as to be entitled to similar treatment."
The Senate Finance Committee proposal provided for a more expansive
reorganization definition than the one passed by the House, but contemporary
135. Id. at 59. The Chamber further explained by providing an example:
[I]f two corporations owned by different interests desire to consolidate and give
their stockholders no cash or property, but only stock representing the same
properties, they may apparently do so free of tax if they happen both to be in the
same State and that State provides by law for procedure which can be called a
"merger or consolidation," but if not, and if the transaction involves one of the
corporations or a new corporation taking over the stocks or properties then a tax is
seemingly payable based upon appraised or estimated values of the stocks.
Id. at 58-59.
136.

S. REP. No. 73-558, at 16 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 586, 598

[hereinafter 1934 SENATE REPORT].
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 599.
Id. at 598.
Id.
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observers still thought it had been "sharply modified" from the existing
provisions.14 As the Committee noted, it required the acquisition of eighty
percent of the target corporation stock.' 4' Ever since the parenthetical clause
was inserted into the reorganization provision in the 1921 Act, Congress had
42
only required the acquisition of a majority of the target corporation stock.
Moreover, both the asset and stock acquisitions would only be entitled to
nonrecognition treatment if the property or stock were exchanged "solely for
the voting stock of the acquiring corporation.' 43 Not only had the former
parenthetical clause not imposed a similar voting stock requirement, it had not
specified the consideration at all. One commentator called
this "[p]erhaps the
44
provisions.'
reorganization
the
to
change"
most radical
Notwithstanding the significant changes to emerge from the Senate
Finance Committee, corporate managers made no protest and the measure
sailed through the Senate. 45 Within a few weeks, the House conferees
accepted the Senate proposal on the reorganization provisions. After little
debate in either the House or the Senate over the Conference Report, the bill
was signed into law in May of 1934.146 Not only did the Revenue Act of
1934, or more specifically its changes to the reorganization provision,
47 but most of its
provoke little opposition on the part of corporate managers,
48
day.
major statutory innovations have endured to this

140.

Magill, supranote 49, at 639 n.9.

141.

Id.

142. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c)(2), ch. 136,42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921) (concerning
acquisition requirement).
143. 1934 SENATE REPORT, supra note 136, at 599.
144. ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEiR FEDERAL TAX STATUS 66
(1948).
145. See 78 CONG. REC. S6574 (1934) (voting with 53 in favor of the measure to 7
opposed with 36 not voting).
146. See BLAKEY &BLAKEY, supranote 121, at 362 (concerning the modest discussion of
the conference report in the House and Senate prior to its passage).
147. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 112(g), 48 Stat. 680, 705 (1934)
(defining "reorganization"). This statement does not mean that corporate managers expressed
no displeasure about other aspects of the bill. See LEFF, supranote 11, at 66 (noting that one of
the chief lobbyists for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce described the Act as an "ill-considered
modified program").
148. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2000) (stating the statutory merger requirement); I.R.C.
§§ 368 (a)(i)(B) &(C) (2000) (concerning voting stock requirements). For a general discussion
of the history of the statutory merger requirement, see Bank, supra note 72.
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IlI. UndistributedProfits Tax
Just two years after the relatively mild reaction to a proposal to restrict a
manager's ability to do a tax-free merger, there was a very different reaction
to a proposal to limit a manager's discretion over dividend policy.
A. Early History
Ever since an income tax was first imposed during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, Congress has struggled with how to reach the undistributed
profits of a corporation. During the nineteenth century, undistributed profits
were taxed as a way to ensure that corporations would not evade dividend
taxes by simply accumulating, rather than distributing, their earnings. Thus,
in 1864, Congress used an undistributed profits tax as an enforcement
mechanism for its taxation of the dividends issued by corporations in certain
industries. 149 The House revived the undistributed profits tax in 1894 when it
passed a bill imposing a dividends tax. 50
Such efforts were not
controversial, however, because the norm was for corporations to distribute
virtually all of their profits as dividends.'

149. See Act of June 30, 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-173, §§ 120-22, 13 Stat. 223, 283-85
(1865) (taxing businesses in certain specified industries, such as transportation, insurance, and
banking, on dividends or interest paid, and on "undistributed sums, or sums made or added
during the year to their surplus or contingent funds").
150. Section 59 of the House Bill provided, in relevant part:
That there shall be levied and collected a tax of 2 per cent on all dividends in scrip
or money thereafter declared due, wherever and whenever the same be declared
payable to stockholders, policy holders, or depositors or parties whatsoever,
including nonresidents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, income
or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and of any fire, marine,
life, inland insurance company, either stock or mutual, under whatever name or
style known or called in the United States or Territories, whether specially
incorporated or existing under general laws, and on all undistributed sums, or sums
made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds.
26 CONG. REc. H6831 (June 26, 1894). As passed, the 1894 Act taxed corporations directly,
but the Supreme Court struck down the income tax as an unconstitutional direct tax. The
corporate tax was never implemented. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
583 (1895) ("We are of opinion that the law in question, so far as it levies a tax on the rents or
income of real estate, is in violation of the Constitution, and is invalid.").
15 1. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Originsof the CorporateIncome Tax,
43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 528-29 (2001).
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After passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, 5 2 Congress once again
employed the undistributed profits tax concept, but only as a penalty
provision. Under the Tariff Act of 1913,53 shareholders were subject to a tax
on their undistributed profits when the corporation was found to have
unreasonably accumulated profits for the purpose of evading the high surtax
rates on individual income. 15 4 This pass-through undistributed profits tax
remained in place until it was deemed to be unconstitutional under the
realization requirement announced in Eisner v. Macomber.15s
In subsequent
years, the undistributed profits tax was applied directly to the corporation
when the purpose of the accumulation was to evade the surtaxes on
individual income or when the corporation was formed for the purpose of
evading the surtaxes.' s 6 Because of the tax's intent requirement, however,
the provision was often not enforced during the early years of the income
tax. 157
Perhaps recognizing the inherent problems with the use of the
undistributed profits tax as a penalty provision, various individuals and
groups forwarded proposals to broaden the tax's scope. In 1917, Senator
Andrieus Jones of New Mexico proposed to tax corporations on a certain
percentage of their undistributed profits regardless of the purpose for the
retention. 5 While a bill introduced by the Senate Finance Committee to
152. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
153. TariffActof1913, PubL. No. 63-16,§ H(A),38Stat. 114(1913).
154. See id. § If(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166-67 (stating that holding beyond reasonable needs is
prima facie evidence of fraudulent purpose). At the time, all individual income was subject to a
flat normal tax, but incomes above a certain level were subject to an additional surtax at
gradually increasing rates.
155. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that income must be
realized or derived from capital before a tax may be imposed). Prior to this case, Congress
merely repeated the 1913 provision in subsequent revenue acts. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub.
L. No. 65-254, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057, 1072 (1919) (repeating language of Revenue Act of 1916);
War Revenue Act of 1917,Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 3, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (1917) (stating that taxes
were generally imposed according to Revenue Act of 1916); Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No.
64-271, § 3, 39 Stat. 756, 758 (1916) (repeating language of Tariff Act of 1913).
156. See John B. Martin, Jr., Taxation of UndistributedCorporateProfits, 35 MICH. L.
REv. 44,49 (1936) (stating that in 1934 the Act "was made applicable where the corporation is
formed or employed for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its
shareholders or upon those of any other corporation through the device of allowing gains and
profits to accumulate instead of being distributed").
157. WALTER LAMBERT, THE NEw DEAL REVENUE AcTs: THE Pouncs OF TAXATION 273
(1970).
158. See id. at 274 (stating the proposal advanced by Senator Jones); Martin, supra note
156, at 44 (concerning the proposal of Senator Jones).
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adopt this proposal was rejected, the Senate eventually adopted something
similar to Jones's original suggestion in an amendment to the Revenue Act of
1924 before it was removed in the House. 5 9 In 1928, the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation revived the undistributed profits tax proposal, but
Congress rejected it amid concerns about making such a radical change during
a period of business expansion.160
B. Revenue Act of 1936
1. Preludeto an UndistributedProfits Tax
Even before he was elected for the first time in 1932, President
Roosevelt's advisors had urged him to consider the possibility of an
undistributed profits tax. As he was campaigning for the presidency,
Roosevelt's small circle of policy advisors-the "Brain Trust" as they came to
be called-were hard at work developing methods of stabilizing the economy
and preventing a repeat of the 1929 stock market crash.' 6 ' In a memorandum to
then-Governor Roosevelt, the Brain Trust outlined what would become the
foundation for the New Deal. 62 Although the memorandum identified many
culprits for the Depression, it laid much of the blame on the unreasonable
159. See LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 274 (stating that the proposal was adopted in the
Senate, but rejected by the House after protests poured in from the business community); Note,
The Surtax on UndistributedProfits, 50 HARv. L. REv. 332, 332 n.2 (1936) (stating that the
Senate passed an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1924 adopting the surtax on undistributed
profits).
160. See BLAKEY& BLAKEY, supra note 121,at 405 (discussing members' concem that the
tax would have a negative effect on small businesses and that the tax yield would be less than
under the usual tax on income); LAMBERT, supranote 157, at 274 (stating there was concern the
measure would slow down business expansion).

161.

See DANIEL R. FUSFELD, THE ECONOMIC THoUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND

THE OhIGINS

OF THE NEW DEAL 207 (1954) (analyzing the organization and role of the Brain
Trust); RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 21-22 (1939) (concerning the origins of the
Brain Trust).
162. See Memorandum from Raymond Moley and others, to Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(May 19, 1932) (in Box 282, Folder 3, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Institution Library and
Archives, Stanford University) (outlining the policy proposals of the Brain Trust) [hereinafter
Memorandum of May 19, 1932]. The May 19 memorandum was written in response to a
request by Roosevelt to keep him updated during his pre-campaign vacation trip to Warm
Springs. It became the opportunity to prepare a series of specific recommendations for various
aspects of the economic crisis and was the foundation of many of Roosevelt's campaign
speeches and eventually his acceptance speech. See FUSFELD, supra note 161, at 219
(concerning the Brain Trust); MOLEY, supra note 161, at 21-22 (discussing the origins of the
Brain Trust).
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accumulation of corporate profits. According to the memorandum, the
prosperity of the Twenties led to "a greater accumulation of surpluses than were
ever before realized in economic history."' 63 This practice of "corporate
hoarding," the memorandum charged, "upset the balance of production and
64
consumption" and contributed both to the crash and the ensuing Depression.
Roosevelt's advisors recommended a "tax on undistributed surplus income of
corporations" as a means
of "forcing undistributed surplus into the general
6
market for capital." 1
While Roosevelt clearly endorsed the basic principles underlying the
recommendation,'6 he did not push for the enactment of an undistributed
profits tax until two events prompted a budgetary crisis at the end of his first
term of office. First, the Supreme Court struck down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act and consequently invalidated the processing taxes Roosevelt
had counted on to finance the Act's operations. 67 Second, Congress overrode
a presidential veto to accelerate payment on World War I veterans' bonuses
from 1945 to 1936.168 The combined result of these two events was a $620
million shortfall in the president's budget 69 To address this shortfall,
Roosevelt and his advisors once again turned to the undistributed profits tax.' 70
163. Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 162, at 1.
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. Id.at 3-4.
166. In his July 1932 acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in
Chicago, for example, he attributed the Depression to heavy "corporate surpluses" used to
finance "unnecessary plants" and rampant pre-crash stock market speculation. July 2, 1932
Speech, in I THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 651 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1938). He did not even suggest the possibility of enacting the specific proposal,
however, until later in his term. In his message to Congress on June 19, 1935, Roosevelt
declared that ultimately we might need to use taxation to "discourage unwieldy and unnecessary
corporate surpluses." ALFRED G. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX 19 n. I (1937).
167. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) ("[The Act] is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal
government. The tax, the appropriation of the funds raised, and the direction for the
disbursement, are but parts of the plan. They are but means to an unconstitutional end.").
Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to pay farmers not to produce a
particular commodity when prices for that commodity fell to dangerously low levels. Id. at 8890.
168. LEFF, supra note I1,at 170. Although this decision meant an immediate cash
payment of almost $2 billion, the real cost of this payment was the $120 million annual carrying
charge on financing the bonuses. Id.
169. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 401 (discussing the budget shortfall);
SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 472 (photo. reprint 1980) (1967)

(same).
170. See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTAu DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIs, 19281938, at 306-07 (1959) (describing the decision to resort to the undistributed profits tax).
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On March 3, Roosevelt addressed Congress in a supplemental budget
message. 171 Ostensibly, the message was merely to announce the need for an
additional $620 million in revenue to replace the processing taxes and fund the
veterans' bonuses. Roosevelt made a point of acknowledging Congress's
discretion to determine the appropriate means to raise such revenue.' 72 His true
aim, however, was to push his proposal for an undistributed profits tax. 73 In
advocating for the undistributed profits tax, Roosevelt did not mention its
potential as a check on corporate managers and a stimulus to the economy.
Roosevelt instead emphasized its two tax policy benefits: 74 (1) its ability to
equalize the treatment of all business owners, and (2) its promise to "stop
'leaks' in present surtaxes."' 175 One particularly novel aspect of Roosevelt's
proposal was that it was designed not to serve as a penalty tax, as it had in the
past, but rather as a replacement for the corporate income tax.176 Distributed
income would be subject to one layer of tax, while retained income would bear
both a corporate and shareholder-level tax.
Unlike the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions in 1934, the
undistributed profits tax proposal aroused "deep opposition" on the part of
corporate managers. 177 Alfred Buehler reported, "[t]he business world ...was
78
aghast at the proposal and shuddered at the consequences if it were adopted."1
Under then-prevailing dividend practices, the tax could not possibly raise the
required $620 million in revenue. 79 Thus, the rates would have to be set high
enough to "compel[] corporations radically to alter their present dividend

171. A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 102 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
172. See id. at 104-05 ("1 leave, of course, to the discretion of the Congress the
formulation of the appropriate taxes for the needed permanent revenue.").
173. Id. at 105-06.
174. LEFF, supra note 1i, at 175-77. Roosevelt may have emphasized the tax policy
benefits because they were less controversial.
175. A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936), supra note 171, at
105.
176. See id. at 106 (quoting Roosevelt as stating that the undistributed profits tax would
accomplish its goals only "if accompanied by a repeal of the present corporate income tax, the
capital stock tax, the related excess profits tax and the present exemption of dividends from the
normal tax on individual incomes").
177. Arthur Krock, Opposition is Divided Over President'sTax Proposal,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1936, at 20.
178. BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 23.
179. See The New Tax Schedule, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 17, 1936, at 20 (stating that if the tax
rates had no influence on dividend policy they would bring in less money than the government
now receives).
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policy" in order to reach its revenue goals.'8 0 This policy would force many
corporations to rely more heavily on expensive and intrusive external financing
sources, something managers are generally disinclined to do, especially when
the alternative is simply to dip into retained earnings.' 8' Managers were
perhaps most offended by the fact that a forced change in dividend policy
would substitute "the blanket judgment of Congress and the Treasury
Department, based on a general theory" for the "individual judgment of
business managers, based
on their direct knowledge of the needs of their
82
particular company."
2. House
Corporate managers were initially restrained in their public responses to
the President's message,"8 3 but this reaction quickly changed as the
undistributed profits tax concept was transformed into a concrete proposal.
Under the bill as it was presented to the House Ways and Means Committee,
the corporate income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits tax
graduated according to the percentage of net income retained.'8 4 For
corporations with annual net income of $10,000 or less, the rates ranged from
1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 29.7% on undistributed net
income of 70.3% or more.'18 For corporations with annual income in excess of
$10,000, the bill proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of
180.
181.

Id.
See Jensen, supra note 19, at 323 ("Financing projects internally avoids this

monitoring and the possibility the funds will be unavailable or available only at high explicit
prices.").
182.

PunishingPrudence,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1936, at 22.

183. See George B. Bryant, Jr., Reform Motive in Tax Program, BARRON'S, Mar. 30,1936,
at 13 (concerning the lack of opposition). Bryant wrote:
The remarkable lack of visible opposition to the proposal to date can be explained
easily. It does not necessarily mean that business and industry will accept it
without question and opposition. The scheme, thus far, has been in a purely
formulative stage, and its effects upon the interests most vitally concerned cannot
be definitely appraised.
Id.; see also Trade Groups Study Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1936, at 30 ("Organized

business groups are reserving any public criticism of the President's plan for taxing corporate
surpluses until later, it developed in a canvas of association offices yesterday .... Advices
received... are to the effect that opposition to the measure will develop within the coming ten
days.").
184.

Revenue Act of 1936: Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the House Comm. on Ways

and Means, 74th Cong. 5 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 House Hearings].
185.

ld. at5-6.
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undistributed net income to a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income
of 57.5% .or more. 8 6 "Undistributed net income" was defined to include
adjusted net income less taxable dividends and the undistributed profits tax
itself. 87 The bill exempted or provided special treatment for banks, insurance
companies, corporations in receivership, foreign corporations, and corporations
that were contractually or legally prohibited from paying dividends.'88 Finally,
the bill subjected dividends to the normal tax on individuals. 89
Despite Internal Revenue Commissioner Guy Helvering's declaration that
"[t]here is no intention or desire whatever to interfere with the internal
management of business enterprises,"' 90corporate managers showed up in force
at the Ways and Means hearings to testify against the proposal. Unlike in 1934,
however, the large trade associations presented oral testimony against the
undistributed profits tax rather than reserving the issue for their written
statements. 19' Moreover, these trade groups often sent multiple representatives
to testify against different aspects of the proposal. Three speakers, for example,
represented the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with their combined testimony
consuming more than seventy-five pages of the transcribed hearings. 91 2 While
this does not speak to the question of whether behind-the-scenes lobbying was
any different in 1936 than 1934, such a public display of protest does suggest
that business believed its views would stand up to public scrutiny.
Not only did the national trade associations devote a substantial portion of
their allotted time to the undistributed profits tax proposal, they were harsh in
their criticism. Noel Sargent, secretary of the National Association of
Manufacturers, argued that the retention of corporate profits produced benefits
ranging from an increase in stockholder value and industrial employment from
the expansion of plant operations to the preservation of working capital and the
protection against depression. '" Fred Clausen of the U.S. Chamber of
186.
187.

Id. at6.
Id. at5.

188.
189.

Id. at6-11.
Id. at9.

190.

Id. at 22.

191. This practice was in part due to the fact that the 1936 hearings were primarily devoted
to the undistributed profits tax issue, and, therefore, the trade groups did not have to pick and
choose among the issues. Nevertheless, corporate managers thought it was important to testify
in person against the proposed undistributed profits tax rather than send inwritten statements.
192. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at 735 (reporting statement of Fred
Clausen); id. at 760 (reporting statement of Roy Osgood); id.
at 803 (reporting statement of E.C.
Alvord).
193. See id. at 203,206-110 (statement of Noel Sargent, Secretary, National Association of
Manufacturers) (concerning benefits of profit retention).
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Commerce was even more candid in his opposition, warning that "[t]his
proposal would cause corporate management to be controlled, in its decisions
on fiscal policy, by fear of government exactions rather than by good business
judgment."' 94 Clausen predicted that the tax:
[W]ould engender such uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue
as to subject the management to grave difficulties with shareholders and
creditors .... You can well imagine the difficulties facing managers and
the board of directors in a company as to how to meet a situation which
would exist if this proposal becomes the law of the land.'
According to Clausen, "[i]t presents the danger that corporate management
would be subject to serious criticism and even law suits if liberal dividend
policies were
followed to escape taxes and gave rise to charges of dissipation of
96
assets."
Many smaller national, regional, and local trade groups joined the
National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
testifying against the tax. A representative of the National Retail Dry Goods
Association warned of the "grave danger that the present highly capitalized
organizations will have a continuing advantage over these smaller corporations"
by virtue of the imposition of the tax. 197 R.C. Fulbright of the Southern Pine
Association echoed this charge, stating that "[w]e consider that it would be a
very great detriment to our smaller companies unless some what can be found
to protect the company that is heavily indebted or the company that must in
order to keep going make needed improvements."' 98 As a representative of the
Detroit Board of Commerce summarized, "a tried system of taxation is much
better than a new system of taxation.'' 99
Perhaps more significant than the trade association testimony was that,
unlike in 1934, business was not content to let its representatives speak for it.
A parade of individual businessmen appeared before the Ways and Means
Committee to testify against the tax. Some of these witnesses were from small
194. Id. at 737 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Finance, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
195. Id. at 739-40.
196. Id. at 740.
197. Id. at 352 (statement of Harold R. Young, National Retail Dry Goods Association).
198. Id. at 468 (statement of R.C. Fulbright, Southern Pine Association).
199. Id. at 841 (statement of Raymond H.Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce). See id. at
857 (statement of John W. O'Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute) ("The
radical change in form of taxation suggested, and the serious effect of the proposed system on
recovery and employment, prompts us to urge your committee to explore the effects and results
with great care, giving full consideration to both practice and theory.").
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businesses that felt threatened by the tax. The president of a bridge corporation
testified that "[t]he smaller companies have only grown by using their earned
surplus in the building of larger facilities and in increasing their working capital
the necessary amount to take care of the increased capacity. 2 ° Not only were
such companies concerned about their ability to grow, but they also argued that
the tax would prevent them from repaying their existing bank indebtedness.20 '
Other witnesses appeared to represent the concerns of larger companies. One
attorney noted that "[s]ince 70 percent of the earnings of [publicly owned
companies] are distributed without regard to the tax brackets of the
stockholders, and since the earnings of [privately owned companies] are
distributed only after careful consideration of the tax brackets of its
stockholders," the Committee should
distinguish between public and private
20 2
corporations in applying the tax.
During their testimony, Treasury representatives attempted to allay
corporate managers' fears. 20 3 First, they pointed out that the tax would still
permit accumulation of a fairly significant surplus. 20 4 According to Herman
Oliphant, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, corporations might be
able to retain twenty to thirty percent of their earnings under the proposal.0 5
200. Id. at 146 (statement of Clyde G. Conley, President, Mount Vernon Bridge Company).
201. See id. at 177 (statement of Dean Alfange, general counsel, Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Company) ("Under the tax recommended by the committee, corporations financed by banks and
those that have weathered the depression by means of bank loans would be severely penalize
[sic] in applying their earnings to the liquidation of these loans.").
202. Id. at 92 (statement of Albert Hubschman, Hubschman & Walsh).
203. Herman Oliphant, General Counsel for the Treasury Department, emphasized that:
[l]t is not for anybody inWashington to tell business executives how much of their
earnings they shall keep back and how much they shall distribute. That is not the
Government's business ....But it is the Government's business to see to it that
those administering the affairs of a corporation shall not use it, nor permit it to be
used for avoiding the surtaxes which everybody else has to pay. That is what this
does.
Id. at 607. The New York Times was clearly dubious of Oliphant's statement, asking:
If the proposed tax is not a tax designed to control the dividend policy of
corporations, one would like to know what it is ....Mr. Oliphant is saying to the
corporations in effect: "We are not trying in the slightest to influence your
dividend policy, but we will put a thumping tax on you if you don't pay out
everything, and let you off scot free from taxes if you do."
Editorial, The Ship and the Rats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1936, at 22.
204. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at 581 (statement of Arthur H. Kent,
Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue) (stating that it "is continually overlooked
that the measure will permit retention of a substantial fraction ...without a corporate tax
burden equal to or in excess of the burden imposed by the present law").
205. Id. at 649 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department).
See also id. at 582 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal
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Second, Treasury officials suggested corporations could satisfy their capital
needs through debt and equity financing, or, where those methods were
unavailable,20 6 by retaining funds through the issuance of taxable stock
dividends.20 7 Recent judicial decisions had confirmed the possibility that a
corporation could issue a type of stock dividend that would be considered
taxable to the stockholder but would permit the corporation to retain the
underlying funds.208
The Treasury's responses appeared sufficient to satisfy any lingering
concerns on the part of most Committee members. Despite opponents' urgings
to proceed slowly before pursuing such a "radical change" in the system of
taxing corporate income, 2 9 the undistributed profits tax emerged from the
Committee and quickly passed in the House with surprisingly little dissent.2 10
Much of this apparent lack of interest was due to the Republicans' decision to
avoid prolonging consideration of an issue that was likely to face stiffer
opposition in the Senate.21

Revenue) (estimating that a corporation might be able to retain as a high as forty percent of
earnings without exceeding its previous income tax liability).
206. See, e.g., id. at 761 (statement of Roy Osgood, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(suggesting that small corporations lacked access to the debt and equity markets).
207. See id. at 582 (concerning alternatives available).
208. See id. at 593 (citing court decisions). In 1935, for instance, the Sixth Circuit held
that a dividend of common stock to preferred stockholders constituted a taxable stock dividend
because it meaningfully changed the preferred stockholders' interest in the corporation. See
Commissioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1935) (holding that
proportionate interest of stockholders was materially altered).
209. Id. at 857 (statement of John W. O'Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products
Institute). See also id. at 841 (statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce) ("I
believe a tried system of taxation is much better than a new system of taxation, which to me
presents many difficulties.").
210. See Turner Catledge, $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins by Vote of 267-93 in House;
Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at I (stating that House passed bill by
vote of 267 to 93); see also House Gets New Tax Bill, But Yield is Still in Doubt; QuickPassage
Forecast,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at I (stating that the House Ways and Means Committee
voted 15 to 8 in favor of reporting the bill to the full House). At times, fewer than ten percent of
the Representatives were present for the debates over the bill, and, according to the New York
Times, "not more than half [of those present] were listening to the discussion." Turner Catledge,
DemocratLines Up With Tax Bill Foes in Attack in House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1936, at 1.See
also 80 CONG. REc. H6009 (Apr. 23, 1936) (statement of Rep. Rich) (stating that only forty
members of the House were present).
211. See RepublicansBar Tax Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 12 (stating that
the Republican leadership decided to vote "no" on the measure and not offer amendments).
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3. Senate
Although opponents were initially emboldened by reports that even proAdministration members of the Senate Finance Committee were dissatisfied
with the House bill,212 the overwhelming approval of the bill in the House
caused such optimism to waver.213 Thus, even before the Senate Finance
Committee began hearings on the proposed undistributed profits tax, corporate
managers and their representatives redoubled their efforts to oppose the bill.
The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York issued a report sharply
condemning the tax: "In practice this proposed tax involves serious Federal
interference with business management. It is a scheme to force the distribution
of corporate profits regardless of the policy dictated by sound business
judgment., 21 4 Similarly strong statements emerged from the annual meeting of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, during which it adopted a resolution decrying
the undistributed
profits tax as an attempt "to regulate the management of
215
corporations. ,
Once the Senate Finance Committee hearings began, business leaders
appeared in even greater numbers than during the House Ways and Means
212. See Alfred F. Flynn, FinanceCommittee Questions Tax Bill on Two Grounds, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 24, 1936, at I (stating that Administration forces indicated a desire to change the

House bill to provide for greater revenue and to simplify its administrative features).
213. See George B.Bryant, Jr., Tax Bill Speeded as Opposition Wanes in Senate,WALL ST.
J., Apr. 29, 1936, at I (concerning waning Senate opposition in the wake of House approval);
Catledge, supra note 210, at I (discussing the effect of the overwhelming vote in the House).
Catledge wrote:
Because of the tremendous House majority intoday's vote and the ease with which
the bill was shoved through the amending stages inthat body yesterday, prospective
opposition in the Senate was felt to be cooling perceptibly. Republican senators
indicated they might follow the lead of their House colleagues and merely make
their record against the whole new tax proposal, without attempting to amend it.
Id.
214. New Tax Law UnsoundSays the Chamber,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1936, at 37. See also
Chamber Attacks Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1936, at 2 (concerning report issued by the

New York State Chamber of Commerce charging that the tax will "retard the growth of industry,
injure labor and jeopardize financial security").
215. Thrust at Tax Bill Winds up Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1936, at 1. The
Chamber's annual meeting was widely covered in the press, and its rhetoric was portrayed as a
symbol of business's growing distrust of the New Deal. See Felix Belair, Jr., Business andthe
New DealStill FarApart, N.Y. TIMEs, May 3, 1936, § 4, at 3 (stating differences between the
Administration and businesses); ChamberSpeakers Assail Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMFS, Apr. 30,
1936, at 10 (attacking Roosevelt's policies); Chamber Talks Caustic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1936, at I (concerning opposition to Roosevelt's policies); Wide Rift Shown Between Business
and New Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 2 (discussing annual meeting of U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
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Committee hearings to testify against the undistributed profits tax. Whereas
fifty-one nongovernmental speakers testified on the bill during the House
hearings, nearly double that number-ninety-four-testified before the Senate
Finance Committee.2 16 The Senate Finance Committee also received letters
from another forty-three individuals or organizations, while the House Ways
and Means Committee received only fourteen such written statements or
letters.2 1 7 Some of the increase in the number of people testifying on the bill
was attributable to the Senate's consideration of a proposal to impose a new
processing tax.218 Nevertheless, the primary topic for most witnesses was the
undistributed profits tax. Although they advocated relegating the tax to a
subordinate role if Congress insisted on adopting it, 219 they maintained a
steadfast opposition to the entire concept. The principal complaint was that the
tax would interfere with normal business operations. Managers' concerns
ranged from the specific concern that the tax would upset the "regularity of
dividend" to the more general worry "over the uncertainty produced by the
constant changing of our tax laws. 220 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
summarized such complaints:
The plan would tend to provide substitution of public control for private
management in important fiscal operations of business. It would promote
improvident and unstable dividend policies in many companies. In others it
would engender such uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue
216. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at llI-IV (cataloging of statements in
the House) with Revenue.Act, 1936: Hearingson H.R. 12395 Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin.,
74th Cong. III-VI (1936) (cataloging of statements in the Senate) [hereinafter 1936 Senate
Hearings].
217. Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at IV (listing statements submitted to
the House) with 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at V-VI (listing statements submitted to
the Senate).
218. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 3 (statement of Henry Morgenthau,
Secretary of the Treasury) (urging consideration of the President's proposed new processing tax,
which was not considered by the House, to replace the one struck down by the Court).
219. One particularly effective argument in this respect was to question the tax's ability to
raise the necessary revenue by itself. See id. at 682 (statement of James A. Emery, general
counsel, National Association of Manufacturers) ("It is not ... a reliable source of revenue, for
it is subject to the variations of business policy rather than the net income of the business
itself"); see also id. at 221 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) ("The
added revenue to be derived is highly uncertain and insufficient. It is less than the budgeted
increase in ordinary expenditures for the next fiscal year.").
220. Id. at 79 (statement of Franklin Spencer Edmonds, Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce); id. at 101 (Statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade). See also id. at
143 (statement of Paul H. Wilson, Graton & Knight Company) (registering concern about
replacing a system we have had for many years for one "that we do not know what it will
produce").
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as to subject the management to grave difficulties with shareholders and
creditors. It presents the danger that corporate management would be
subject to serious criticism and even lawsuits if liberal dividend policies,
221
followed to escape taxes, give rise to charges of dissipation of assets.
The constant themes running throughout managers' testimony was that the tax
constituted an unwarranted interference with their ability to run the corporation.
Not only were there more people protesting the undistributed profits tax
bill, but they were also more direct in complaining about the potential
interference with corporate management. Noel Sargent of the National
Association of Manufacturers warned that "[a]ny attempt to substitute the
judgment of commissions or legislators for that of industrial executives as to
the percentage of earnings which can be properly distributed as dividends is
economically unsound and fraught with dangers alike to employees,
stockholders, and the public. 2 22 Herman Lind of the National Machine-Tool
Builders Association echoed such concerns, suggesting that the conflict
between management and shareholders, and other conflicts, engendered by
the tax "will deflect the energies of management from the aggressive
production and sale of goods and services which are its main function, to
attempts to cope
with a tangled mass of administration problems and
223
uncertainties. ,
Although managers preferred to cut the undistributed profits tax out of
the bill entirely, they tried to influence the Finance Committee's
consideration of several compromise proposals. In one prepared with the
substantial assistance of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the undistributed
profits tax would become a mere temporary supplement to the corporate
income tax.224 In another, the undistributed profits tax rate would be set at
exactly the same rate as the normal tax on dividends, thereby effectively
nullifying its effect on dividend policy. 225 When the Senate Finance
221. Id. at 225 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
222. Id. at 651 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).
223. Id. at 520 (statement of Herman H. Lind, General Manager, National Machine-Tool
Builders Association). See also id. at 724 (statement of H.W. Story, Allis Chalmers
Manufacturing Company) ("But with the normal pressure upon management by stockholders for
the payment of larger dividends, it would become more difficult for management to pursue a
conservative policy of utilizing a large proportion of it earnings for the purpose of promoting
the growth of the company.").
224. See Senate Group PlansComplete Tax Bill Revision, WALL ST. J., May 9,1936, at I
(concerning proposed revisions). Under this proposal, the corporate income tax would be
retained at rates ranging from 17.5% to 20% and dividends would be subject to the normal tax,
but the undistributed profits tax would remain a part of the bill for only three years. id. at I.
225. See Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1936, at 18 (stating
alternative proposal).
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Committee Chair, Pat Harrison, proposed a modest three percent spread
between the normal (four percent) and undistributed profits tax (seven
percent) rates, corporate managers howled,2 26 but it was eventually adopted
by both the Committee and the full Senate.227
As the bill proceeded to a conference committee to resolve the
differences between the radically different House and Senate versions,
corporate managers took their case to shareholders directly and to the public
at large. The president of General Motors, Alfred Sloan, sent a letter to
shareholders with the regular quarterly dividend in which he warned that it
"would be little short of a catastrophe" for the government to interfere with
"the employment of accumulated profits by aggressive and intelligent
management." 228 The National Association of Manufacturers issued a
statement declaring:
Both the Senate Finance Committee and House bills accept the principle
of taxation of undistributed profits ....Such a proposal is economically
unsound, since it repudiates the policy of industrial reinvestment of
earnings upon which expansion and employment have been based for
over 100 years, and because it seeks to substitute government judgment
as to the desirable amount of corporate reserves for that of directors
elected by corporate stockholders.
Managers hoped that these public relations efforts would pressure Congress
to abandon the undistributed profits tax entirely, but they ultimately proved
unsuccessful. The conference committee successfully pushed through a
compromise proposal. Thus, under the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress
retained the corporate income tax, subjected dividends to the normal tax, and
imposed an undistributed profits tax at rates ranging from seven percent to
twenty-seven percent.230
226. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a statement denouncing Harrison's

compromise. See Turner Catledge, New Tax Programis HeldAdequate by the Treasury,N.Y.
May 17, 1936, at I (quoting the Chamber as stating, "[t]he introduction of that principle
[the undistributed profits tax] into our tax system in any form whatever is opposed by business
on the justifiable ground, among others, that it would inject government into the management of
private enterprise").
227. See Turner Catledge, 18% CorporateIncome Tax and 7% on UndividedProfitAgreed
on by Senate Group, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 1936, at I (passing Senate Committee by 18 to I
vote); Tax Bill is Passedby Senate, 38 to 24; Conference to Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1936, at I
(concerning passage by the Senate).
228. DecreedDividends Opposed by Sloan, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1936, at 33.
229. Heated Debate on Taxes Forces Recess in Senate; Rise in Surtaxes Voted, N.Y.
TIMES,

TIMES,

230.

June 4, 1936, at 1.
Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1655 (1936).
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C. The Campaign to Repeal the Tax in the Revenue Act of 1938
1. Aftermath of the 1936 Act
In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1936 Act, business
opposition to the undistributed profits tax did not subside. According to
Alfred Buehler, national and regional business associations "continued to
direct broadsides of criticism against the measure because of its alleged
complexities, inequalities, and unfortunate effects on corporations."2 31 John
Morton Blum recounted that, "[b]ecause that tax tended to return to
stockholders the decision about how to spend or invest their money, it
challenged the power of professional managers of large corporations. These
managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in all an able, articulate, and
influential group, were aggressive opponents of the tax., 232 Republicans also
helped sustain opposition by highlighting it, during the 1936 election
campaign, as an example of the Administration's antibusiness stance.233 Alf
Landon, the Republican candidate for president, vowed to eliminate "this
vicious method of taxation," calling the undistributed profits tax "the
most
' 234
cockeyed piece of tax legislation ever imposed in a modem country.
When managers were forced to increase their dividend distributions as a
result of the 1936 Act, 235 they used it as another opportunity to publicly assail
231. BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 35. See LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 409 ("Business
representatives continued to complain that the law impaired the financial strength of
corporations, imposed unreasonable penalties upon expansion, and retarded economic recovery.
Business executives, lawyers, and economists gloomily predicted that the levy on undivided
corporate surpluses would lead to industrial stagnation, increased unemployment, and a
financial collapse."). For a typical expression of such sentiments, see Executives Sound
Confident Keynote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1937, at 55 (concerning year-end statement of W.G.
Carey, president of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, assailing undistributed profit tax).
232. BLUM, supra note 170, at 321.
233. See BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 36 (concerning criticism of the tax by Republicans,
including Alfred M. Landon and Herbert Hoover); HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 356 (stating that
Republican orators "leveled many a barrage at it during the campaign of 1936").
234. Alf M. Landon, Federaland Family Finances, 2 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 762,
764 (Sept. 15, 1936).
235. See GEORGE E. LENT, THE IMPACT OFTEM UNDISTIBtEDPROFrrSTAx 1936-1937,at
33 (1948) (concluding that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for an increase of
dividends by one-third); E.J.H., Jr., Some Economic Aspects of the Surtax on Undistributed
Profits of Corporations, 25 GEO. L.J. 423,435 (1937) (discussing the large amount ofdividend
announcements). The author wrote:
During the last few weeks of 1936 announcements have been made of extra
dividends, of bonuses, and of wage increases, running into millions of dollars.
Each day brings announcement of further actions of this character, and when the
statistics are finally compiled for the calendar year 1936, the total of these
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the undistributed profits tax. The National Association of Manufacturers
spearheaded a campaign to send letters to shareholders explaining that a desire
to avoid the tax, and not the exercise of business judgment, forced the extra
dividends. 6 In one example, a prominent oil company declared a special
dividend with an accompanying explanation:
This special dividend declaration is made in order to reduce the company's
liability for the new Federal tax on undistributed earnings. Because of the
company's needs for capital expenditures and debt payments, the directors
would prefer to retain in the business the cash represented by this special
dividend. In any event, they would not ordinarily declare any dividend at
this time with respect to earnings for the present calendar year, as such
earnings cannot be known with sufficient237exactness in the usual course of
business for some time after year's end.
Similar statements accompanied announcements of other changes necessitated
by the undistributed profits tax. For example, the president of a public electric
company explained that the directors voted in favor of a stock split with a
reduction in stated par value because the tax would potentially interfere with
plans for capital expenditures, 2 38 and a steel corporation executive sent a letter
to stockholders blaming the undistributed profits tax "for abandoning
its old
2 39
policy of financing expansion and improvements out of earnings.
Some corporate managers complemented their public activism against the
tax by passively resisting its underlying principles. Thus, they continued
retaining profits either by resorting to taxable stock dividends or by agreeing to
incur the undistributed profits tax penalty. The former method, although
specifically recommended by Treasury officials during the hearings, 240 was only
used by a miniscule percent of the companies subject to the tax because of legal
uncertainties. 24 ' By contrast, a substantial number ofmanagers simply chose to
disbursements will probably reach, if not pass, the half billion mark.

Id.
236. See LEFF, supra note I1,at 249 (noting the advent of "NAM sponsored shareholder
letters in 1936").
237. M.L. Seidman, The Stockholder Holds the Bag, 59 MAG. OF WALL Sr. 156, 157
(1936). For other examples, see Profits-Tax Levy Avoided By Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1937,
at 31 ("Distribution of extra and special dividends before the end of 1936 enabled Supervised
Shares, Inc., to avoid liabilities under the tax on undistributed profits, Merrill Griswold,
chairman, and Mahlon E. Traylor, president, said in a quarterly report issued yesterday.").
238. See Will Balance Effect of Federal Surtax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1937, at 23
(concerning request to authorize stock split).
239. FinancingPlannedby Ludlum Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1937, at 31.
240. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing the 1936 House hearings).
241. See William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and
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pay the tax rather than distribute their free cash flow. According to one recent
study, a surprisingly high percentage of corporations paid marginal rates of
twenty-two percent or more under the tax.242 Thus, managers in these
corporations chose to incur the penalty either because of the deficiencies of
shareholder monitoring or because shareholders implicitly or explicitly
consented.
2. Recession of 1937
In the spring of 1937, a severe economic downturn opened a window of
opportunity for managers to begin a campaign to repeal the undistributed
profits tax.243 Critics blamed the tax either partially or completely for a variety
of economic ills, 2" including: the decline of retail credit;2 45 delay and
termination of expansion plans; 246 lagging employment; 247 the onset and
aggravation of stock market volatility;248 and what the president of General Tire
the UndistributedProfits Tax of 1936 and 193 7,49 J.FIN. 1727, 1753 n. 19 (1994) (noting that
one-third of one percent of all corporations subject to the tax issued taxable stock dividends);
Godfrey N. Nelson, Law Still is Hazy on Stock Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1936, § III,
at I
(concerning the unsettled law).
242. See Charles W. Calomiris & R. Glenn Hubbard, InternalFinance and Investment:
Evidence From the UndistributedProfits Tax of 1936-1937, 68 J. Bus. 443, 451 tbl.2 (1995)
(stating that between 17% and 23% of small to medium-sized corporations paid such tax rates).
243. "Before the economy picked up in the late spring of 1938," Mark Leff observed,
"industrial production fell by a third, durable-goods production and stock prices slipped by half,
and profits skidded to one-fifth their 1937 highs. Unemployment, always a tragic
embarrassment to the New Deal, shot up by nearly 4 million." LEFF, supra note 11, at 209.
244. Another tax provision cited as a cause of the economic downturn was the capital gains
tax. See Tax Modification Asked as Trade Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1937, at 28 (concerning
statement by Consumer Goods Industries Committee).
245. See Profits Tax Slows Recovery, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1937, at 20
(concerning statement by controller of National Retail Dry Goods Association).
246. See Levy on Profits Halts Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1937, at 24 (reporting
results of survey on effects of profits tax).
247. See 15 Criticisms Made of the Profit Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 24
(concerning U.S. Chamber of Commerce study); Surplus Tax Repeal Held Labor Benefit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1937, § III,
at 8 (concerning National Association of Manufacturers Study).
248. See A Tax Theory Demolished,WALL ST.J., Oct. 22, 1937, at 4 (stating that the stock
market explosion was a demonstration of a basic weakness in theory upon which the
undistributed profits tax was created); BallantineFinds New DealHarmful, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1937, at 10 (highlighting the undistributed profits tax among New Deal programs "as
responsible for the current stock market slump"); Our Taxes Too High, PerilingBusiness,
Tremaine Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 1937, at I ("[New York State Controller] Tremaine
blamed the stock market slump directly upon the Federal Capital Gains and Losses Tax, and the
Undistributed Profits Tax.").
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and Rubber Company called "strikes by capital," where a lull in business confidence
caused both large- and small-time capitalists, as well as corporate financiers, to keep
their money on the sidelines rather than to invest in business. 249 Horace Stoneham,
the president of the New York Giants professional baseball team, even went so far
inability to sign a high profile
as to blame the undistributed profits tax for his team's
250
Cardinals.
Louis
St.
the
of
Medwick
Joe
star like
Although economists refuted claims that the undistributed profits tax was
responsible for starting the recession,25' corporate managers blamed the tax for
creating "a climate of fear and uncertainty" that both contributed to the recession
and made recovery more difficult 25 2 Prominent business leaders such as the
president of Chernical Bank advocated repeal "as a means of restoring confidence
among business men."253 The American Institute of Accountants issued a report
declaring that for business "to face the future confidently," Congress must return to
"fixed principles of Federal income taxation" and abandon the failed undistributed
profits tax.254

3. Revenue Act of 1938

The combination of the recession and the steady campaign against the tax
sealed its fate. The only question in 1938 was whether it would be repealed outright
249. Capital 'Strikes'Laid to Tax Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1937, at 25. See also Profits
Tax Held Bar to Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1937, at 33 (concerning New York Board of

Trade position urging repeal of Undistributed Profits Tax).
250. Unfair to Baseball, BUS. WEEK, Dec. II, 1937, at 44. According to Stoneham:
If you wanted to spend your surplus on ball players, the government would step in
and stop you. That sort of thing is inimical to baseball. If you make a lot of money
you want to make more by strengthening your club. But you cannot do what you
please. You've got to distribute a large part of your profits to stockholders.
Id.
251.

See Eased Income Tax Urged By Tremaine, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15,1937, at 12 ("Dr.

Willard L. Thorp, director of economic research for Dun & Bradstreet, said there was 'danger in
saying that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for the recession.' He declared there
would have been a slump if there had been no such tax.").
252. LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 414. See Lewis H. Kimmel, Experience Under the
UndistributedProfits Tax, II CoNF. BOARD BULL. 105, 105-15 (1937) (survey of 360 corporate
executives revealed that many corporate expansion plans were delayed by fear of the tax's effect
on surpluses); Godfrey N.Nelson, Loss of Confidence Laid to Tax of 1936, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1938, § I1, at I ("[Tlhe results of research show that the undistributed-profits tax is one of
the major causes of the loss of business confidence.").
253. F.K. Houston Urges Repeal of Two Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1937, at 33.
254. Taxation Found 'Bugaboo' of Corporations; Accountants Advocate Nonpartisan
Study, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1937, at 41.
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or merely nullified by reducing its rate so lowthat it no longer acted as an incentive
to distribute profits. Although Congress initially aimed for the latter option,2s
business leaders were not satisfied. They argued that maintaining even the nominal
undistributed profits tax proposed in the subcommittee report was unacceptable.
During hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee in January of 1938,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended "[r]epeal[ing] the thoroughly
discredited undistributed profits tax and openly abandon[ing] the 'principle."' 2 56 As
one railroad executive noted, nothing short of repeal would be sufficient:
The continuation ofthis tax, even in the modified form proposed, will continue
to hamper business and destroy the confidence of business management in its
ability to look ahead and to plan and enter into long-time conimitmients, which
constitutes
257 the very essence of recovery. This tax should be repealed in its
entirety.
While corporate managers spoke of the hardships still imposed under the revised
tax, the principal concern appeared to be that retaining the principle would invite the
reintroduction of more meaningful rates in subsequent years. 2 "
The proposal to retain the undistributed profits tax received an equally chilly
reception in the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. The chair of the
Committee, Senator Pat Harrison, issued a statement announcing his intent to secure
the tax's repeal: "While the House retained only the skeleton of the undistributed
profits tax... the remains will haunt business, and its complete removal and
return to a sufficient flat corporation tax is preferable."2 9 This statement

255. A subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee proposed merging the
undistributed profits tax with the corporate income tax so that the corporate rate would range
between 16% and 20% depending upon the percentage of profits distributed. See Steven A.
Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise ofDouble Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 167, 239-40 (2002) (describing the subcommittee plan). The net effect would be to
make the 4% pressure to distribute identical to the 4% tax on dividends, and thus create pressure
not to distribute.
256. Revision of Revenue Laws 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong. 485 (1938) (prepared statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce). See also id. at 155 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade) ("The

undistributed profits tax stands before the country today thoroughly convicted as an undesirable
tax and as harmful to business and to confidence. It has earned its execution. Let it die.").
257. Id. at 417 (statement of George Houston, President, Baldwin Locomotive Works).
258. See, e.g., Tax Bill Sent to Conference, House Not Yielding on Changes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1938, at I (reporting that Representative Lamneck of Ohio "declared that the business
interests were absolutely opposed to the undistributed profits tax theory, as retained in the
House bill, 'not because it is going to levy a high tax on them, but because they fear we may use
the principle to raise the rates and change the schedule."').
259. Harrison Demands End ofProfits Tax to Help Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1938,
at 1.
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echoed the sentiments of most business leaders. A representative of the
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce warned that retaining the principle would
make it "an ever-constant threat," 26 while M.L. Seidman of the New York
Board of Trade predicted that "it would remain to haunt business, not only for
what it is, but also for what it may eventually grow into if permitted to remain
as a permanent part of our tax structure. 261 Ellsworth Alvord of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce asked, "[I]f you impose 3/2 percent this year... what is
not boost that penalty to 42!/2
there to assure a businessmen that you 2will
62
percent as was proposed two years ago?"
As expected, both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate heeded
business's complaints and overwhelmingly voted to repeal the undistributed
profits tax altogether. 263 Only a last-ditch effort by President Roosevelt led to
what one conferee called a "face-saver" in the Conference Committee. 264 The
tax was retained at the very low rate of 2.5 percent, but it was scheduled to
expire after 1939.265 While Roosevelt hoped to revive it at a later date, the
opposition was too great. As Robert La Follette, the lone senator who publicly
challenged the repeal, observed that the undistributed profits tax "has been the
object of one of the most widely organized 2and most successful propaganda
campaigns in the history of tax legislation. 6
260.

Revenue Act of 1938: Hearingon H.R. 9682Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance,75th

Cong. 183 (1938) (statement of J.W. Hooper, Chairman of the Federal Tax Committee,
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter 1938 Senate Hearings].
261. Id. at 257 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York
Board of Trade).
262. Id. at 469 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also id.
at 19 (statement of Henry H.Heimann, National Association of Credit Men) (testifying infavor

of repeal of the undistributed profits tax). According to Heimann:
We think that the present undistributed-profits tax will not constitute the menace,
the penalty that it has in the past, but nevertheless we still believe the principle of
the tax is dangerous, and there is no assurance at any time that the law may not be
changed with respect to rates so that the same danger that was inherent in the 1936
bill will again become included in the bill.
Id.
263. See Lauren D. Lyman, Profit Tax Eliminated, Gains Levy is Modified by Senate
Finance Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1938, at I (declaring that the repeal passed Senate
Finance Committee by 17 to 4 vote); Senate Approves Most of Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1938, at 3 (stating that bill passed the Senate by 41 to 27 vote).
264. Profits Tax Looms as Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1938, at 4.
265. Modified Surplus Tax for Two Years Retained in Senate-House Compromise, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1938, at I.
266. 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 4932 (statement of Sen. La Follette). La
Follette's Investigating Committee in the Senate found that the National Association of
Manufacturers had spent almost Si million a year fighting the undistributed profits tax since its
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IV. A CorporateNorms-Based Explanation
What accounts for the difference in corporate managers' reactions to the
two proposals? Both appeared to be attempts to restrict behavior in ways that
under traditional agency cost theory analysis managers were likely to oppose.
In the case of tax-free reorganizations, the elimination or restriction of this
option would likely decrease a manager's ability to expand his empire and
pursue pet projects. In the case of the undistributed profits tax, the crimp on
managerial discretion over dividend policy and resulting decline in free cash
flow would either reduce managers' ability to pursue individual projects or
force them to be subjected to the scrutiny of the capital markets.
Some of the differences in reaction may have been the result of the
peculiar political and economic circumstances of the day. During President
Roosevelt's first term, when the Revenue Act of 1934 was introduced and the
stock market crash was still a recent memory, business may have been inclined
to be more cooperative in its dealings with the Administration. 267 By the time
passage. In conjunction with the efforts of other groups such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce:
[E]very known medium of reaching the public with their propaganda has been
used, including advertising in the daily and weekly newspapers, and colored news
articles. The [La Follette Investigating Committee] records show they have also
used direct mail, booklets, leaflets, bulletin board posters, 24 sheet posters for
outdoor boards, pay envelope slips, sound slide films, moving picture slides, plant
publications and house organ service, nation-wide radio programs, including the
'American Family Robinson' cartoon service and the 'Uncle Abner' series and
under many other names.
W.D. McFarlane, Weekly Newsletter, WICHITA BANNER, March 11, 1938, in William Doddridge
McFarlane Papers, 1919-1981, Box No. 3U265, Center for American History, University of
Texas.
267. See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 36, at 244 (observing that during the spring and
summer of 1933, "[p]owerful business leaders cooperated with the administration in a spirit of
cheerful compliance contrasting sharply with the hostility which they had displayed toward
Bryanism, Progressivism, and the New Freedom"); LEFF, supra note 11, at 133 ("Earlier in the
New Deal, with economic survival and political stability hanging in the balance, businessmen
had good reason to go along with the New Deal's 'concert of interests' theme."). This
conciliatory position may have been adopted out of necessity. As Richard Hofstadter observed:
[T]he coming of the depression and the revelation of some of the less palatable.
business practices of the 1920's brought about a climate of opinion in which the
leadership of business, and particularly of big business, was profoundly distrusted
and bitterly resented. Its position certainly was, in these respects, considerably
weaker than it had been twenty-five years before.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 312 (1955). Business also may have been more
muted because one of its major lobbying organizations-The National Association of
Manufacturers-was in a period of reorganization between 1933 and 1934. See Philip H.
Burch, Jr., The NAMas an InterestGroup, 4 POL. & SOC'Y. 97, 102 n. 16 (1973) (describing the
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the undistributed profits tax was enacted, however, the political climate had
changed. Roosevelt was perhaps at the height of his power in 1936, but in
reaching that point he had sabotaged any possibility of working together with
business.268 The fact that Roosevelt himself had initiated the undistributed
profits tax proposal, while the recommendation to abolish the tax-free
reorganization came from a congressional subcommittee, may have heightened
the stakes from the perspective of business leaders. By 1937, when the country
was in the throes of another economic downturn, the tide had turned and
business leaders had more leverage to use in the fight against purportedly
antibusiness measures.2 69
While the timing factor is not insignificant, it should not be overstated.
Business started to criticize the Administration as early as the fall of 1933 and
the beginning of 1934.270 A temporary truce was not declared until after the
elections in 1934, which was well after the reorganization provisions had been
amended. 271 Moreover, even if business leaders had resisted opposing the
reform because of their pledge to cooperate with the recovery program, it
should not have prevented them from seeking the repeal of the restrictions once
they felt their compact with the Administration had been broken. They did this
not only in their battle over the undistributed
profits tax but also in reversing
272
the abolition of the consolidated return.
reorganization); Richard W. Gable, A Political Analysis of an Employers' Associations: The
National Association of Manufacturers 228-45 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago) (on file with the University of Chicago) (same).
268. See CoNKrN, supra note 65, at 81 (describing Roosevelt's campaign for the presidency
in 1936 as "a much more aggressive, even provocative campaign than in 1932, with angryjabs
at economic autocracy, organized money, economic tyranny, and forces of selfishness and of
lust for power").
269. See LEFF, supra note I1,at 231 ("Until 1937, the Roosevelt administration set the
terms of debate on taxation. But the recession changed that, allowing the business community
to take charge.").
270. See BEARD & BEARD, supra note 36, at 245 (stating that by late autumn 1933 an
opposition began to emerge); HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 151 (stating that the "first major wave
of business criticism had come in the fall of 1933 and the first part of 1934"). Business power
was not weaker during this period. Despite its reorganizations in 1933, or perhaps because of it,
the National Association of Manufacturers succeeded in blocking or securing concessions on
several bills unfavorable to business in 1934. Richard W. Gable, NAM: Influential Policy or
Kiss of Death?, 15 J. POL. 254, 268 (1953).
271. See HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 153 (stating that business leaders, following the
elections of 1934, did seem willing to make peace).
272. Starting in 1918, corporations that were considered "affiliated" under the tax laws
because of their common stock ownership or parent-subsidiary relationship were permitted to
file a single return that reflected the consolidated income of the group. In 1932, Congress began
to impose an additional tax for the privilege of filing a consolidated return, and in 1934, the
consolidated return was abolished completely except for railroads. See TWENTIETH CENTURY
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It is also possible that the difference in reaction was in part a reflection of
the extent of the underlying changes in the current tax law. Ever since 1918,
managers had been subject to a fairly strict set of requirements in order to
qualify their transactions as tax-free reorganizations. Moreover, the final
changes enacted by Congress, while considered substantial by tax practitioners,
still left intact the basic scheme for such transactions. In that sense, the changes
might not be described as "revolutionary." By contrast, no undistributed profits
tax existed prior to 1936. President Roosevelt's proposal to eliminate the
corporate income tax and the dividend exemption, while subjecting
undistributed profits to a high levy, would have been a sharp change from the
corporate tax system that had developed during the preceding two decades.
Cutting against the merit of a degree of change-based argument is that the
undistributed profits tax also was not altogether new. From the beginning of
the income tax in 1913, managers had been subject to an accumulated earnings
tax on earnings retained for the purpose of evading the surtax rates. While this
provision was often not enforced because of the difficulty of proving intent, its
use had been upheld in a 1936 Board of Tax Appeals case,273 which was
eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1938.274 In 1934, Congress
adopted a personal holding company tax for smaller companies that omitted an
intent requirement.275 While neither of these provisions approached the
expansive reach of the undistributed profits tax proposal,276 they did introduce
corporate managers to the concept of a tax limitation on dividend policy.
The full legislative histories of the two provisions further weaken the
substantive argument regarding the extent of the change. From an ex ante
perspective, the original proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions was
just as radical as the undistributed profits tax proposal, yet it was not subject to
FUND, supra note 11, at 177-78 (describing the history of taxation on consolidated returns).
This repeal was justified as part of an attack on the holding company structure. See Daniel C.
Schaffer, The Income Tax on IntercorporateDividends, 33 TAx LAW. 161, 165 (1979) (stating
that it was hoped the proposal would help to eliminate holding companies); Tax Bill Changes
Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38 (proposing elimination of consolidated and
affiliated returns in the present law). By 1942, Congress revived the consolidated return,
although it still subjected the return to an additional tax. Schaffer, supra, at 168-69.
273. See Nat'l Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 163, 167 (1936) (finding that
petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that the accumulation of earnings was for
the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its sole stockholder).
274. See Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282,295 (1938) (stating that it was error
for the Court of Appeals to reverse the Board's decision).
275. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 351, 48 Stat. 751-52 (1934)
(omitting an intent requirement).
276. See Paul Marcuse, Taxation of UndistributedProfits, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 1, 8 (1937)
(recounting the history and deficiencies of the two provisions).
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nearly as much active opposition from business leaders. Moreover, from an ex
post perspective, business leaders were eager to eliminate all traces of the
undistributed profits tax in 1938, notwithstanding the reduction of the rate to a
level that would make it a non-factor in dividend decisions, while there was no
similar attempt to further reduce the restrictions on tax-free reorganizations
after the 1934 Act was passed.
Thus, while a variety of historical and statute-specific factors may have
influenced the different reactions to the two proposals, they do not, either
individually or in the aggregate, offer a complete explanation. There is one
potential factor, however, that has not been explored--the underlying norms
that governed the behavior Congress sought to regulate through the tax laws.
In the case of reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions were historically
subject to the oversight of both shareholders and the state legislature, and
managers were not accustomed to free rein in this area. By contrast, dividend
policy had always been the exclusive province of directors. This distinction
may have affected managerial attitudes toward the government's attempt to
regulate those areas through the tax laws.
A. Mergers and Acquisitions
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, managers were
subject to heavy constraints on their ability to engage in a merger or
acquisition. First, such transactions were subject to a shareholder vote, often
one that required unanimous or near unanimous consent. Second, for most
fundamental corporate changes such as mergers and consolidations, managers
had to secure the approval of the state, either by statute or via a provision in
their corporate charter. Third, the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890 introduced federal oversight of mergers and combinations. The combined
effect of these constraints was to undercut any notion of managerial primacy on
the issue of mergers and acquisitions. Thus, it is not surprising that managers
responded to the proposed changes with relatively muted rhetoric.
1. ShareholderApproval
There is a long tradition of shareholder primacy in the context of a
fundamental corporate change. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century,
almost all courts required the unanimous consent of shareholders before a
corporation could pursue transactions such as a merger, acquisition, or sale of
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assets.277 Thus, while corporate managers could initiate these and other similar
transactions, shareholders were empowered with the ability to block such

transactions simply by withholding their consent.
The theory underlying the unanimous consent requirement was that a
fundamental corporate change constituted a breach of the shareholder's contract and
a violation ofhis property rights. 278 As to the former justification for unanimity, the
argument was that a shareholder entered into a contract with the corporation when
he purchased its stock. This contract, deriving some of its content from the ultra
vires doctrine,279 implied that the corporation had a duty to continue in operation
under roughly the same terms as it had done at the time of purchase. By merging
with another corporation or selling all of its assets, the corporation effectively
abandoned its former charter and thereby breached the contract 28 As to the latter
justification for unanimity, the concern was that the shareholder's property interest
in the business's assets would be taken through a transfer of the assets.

In 1890, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the unanimous consent requirement
to invalidate a transaction in Mason v. PewabicMiningCompany."' In Mason, the
taxpayer's charter had expired, and the company was in the process of winding up
277. See Kean v. Cent. R.R. Co., 9 N.J. Eq. 401,422-23 (N.J. Ch. 1853) (holding that the
consent of all stockholders of the Elizabethtown and Somerville Railroad Company was
required before the purchases authorized by that act become valid); GEORGE W. FIELD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 168 (1877) (concerning acts not within the
scope of director's powers); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960, at 87 (1992) (discussing merger requirements in the 1880s); VICrOR MORAwErz, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORI'ORATIONS § 54, at 49 (1882) (stating that it is well
settled that corporations cannot be consolidated without the unanimous consent of their
shareholders).
278. See HORWITZ, supranote 277, at 87 (describing the reason for the unanimous consent
rule).
279. See id. at 86-87 (concerning "ultra vires" attacks on the "pool" as a form of merger).
280. See, e.g., Kean, 9 N.J. Eq. at 414 (concerning the breach of contract through merger).
The court stated:

That the majority should have the power claimed for them, does not seem to me to
be the contract between the stockholders, for there is a contract, as already shown
in the case of every corporation, between them. That contract is, that their joint
funds shall, under the care of specified persons, generally called directors, be
employed, and that for certain specified purposes.
Id. The modem concept of a dissenter's right to the value of his shares was not considered
satisfactory under the unanimous consent requirement. In Kean, the court stated:
It can hardly, therefore, I think, be argued with justice, that a majority of the
stockholders had a right, upon principle, to sell out all the property of the company
from which its profits were to be realized and abandon the business, and that the
minority's rights are satisfied by a division to them of the value of their stock.
Id. at 414-I5.
281. Mason v. Pewabic Min. Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890).
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its affairs.28 2 The directors and a majority of the stockholders sought to transfer
the assets to a new corporation, of which they would be directors and
stockholders, in exchange for shares of stock in the new corporation or their
equivalent value. 28 3 The Court upheld the dissenting stockholders' right to
block the transfer. According to the Court:
[T]here is no superior right in two or three men in the old company, who
may hold a preponderance of the stock, to acquire an absolute control of the
whole of it, in the way which they may think to be to their interest, or which
they may think to be for the interest of the whole ....[W]e know of no
reason or authority why those holding a majority of the stock can place a
value upon it at which a dissenting minority must sell, or do something else
2
which they think is against their interest, more than a minority can do. 8
This principle of unanimity continued to be the common law rule well into
the twentieth century. 2 ss According to the 1927 edition of a contemporary
treatise, "[iln the absence of statutory authority the consent of every stockholder
is absolutely essential to a consolidation; and dissenting stockholders can not be
compelled to give their assent. 28 6 Even when a charter provided that in the
absence of specific direction the company shall have the greatest rights and
privileges accorded to a corporation of its type, the courts refused
to approve a
28 7
consolidation with less than unanimous shareholder approval.
While the unanimous consent requirement could be and was relaxed by
state statute in some jurisdictions by the 1930s,288 directors were still
subordinated to the shareholders on the issue of fundamental corporate change.
As William Meade Fletcher explained in the 1919 edition of his Cyclopedia on
the Law of Private Corporations,"[c]onsolidation cannot be effected by the
action of the boards of directors but must be consented to by at least a majority
282.

Id. at 51.

283.

Id. at 51-52.

284. Id. at 59.
285. The use of the phrase "common law" here is not to suggest that the merger was
possible under the common law, but rather that, in the absence of statutory direction in a
jurisdiction where a merger was permitted, unanimous consent was required.
286. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & JOSEPH W. THOMPSON, 8 COMMENTARiES ON THE LAW OF
CORPORAnoNs 93 (3d ed. 1927).
287. See id. at 95 (concerning power to consolidate and citing Bolts v.Simpsonville &Buck
Creek Tpk. Rd. Co., 10 S.W. 134 (Ky. 1888)).

288. See HORWrrZ, supra note 277, at 88 (citing Delaware, New York, and New Jersey
among those states permitting mergers with less than unanimous consent). The requirement had
actually been relaxed by statute in some jurisdictions early in the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
1849 Mass. Acts 223, § II (allowing transfer of stock on majority vote); 1831 N.J. Laws 124
(allowing consolidation on seven-eighths vote); 1856 Pa. Laws 197 (permitting consolidation
on two-thirds vote).
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of the stockholders."' 28 9 The same rules were in place for a sale of all of the
assets of a corporation, where, according to one contemporary commentator,
nearly half of the state statutes had abandoned the unanimous consent
requirement, but all still required at least a majority. 290 Sometimes this rule
meant a majority of the stock ownership, so that in practice a few stockholders
could still control the decisions, 29' although occasionally it simply meant a
majority or more of the stockholders present at a duly called meeting in which
at least a quorum was present.292 Typically, the requirement for "majority"
approval meant considerably more than that, often requiring two-thirds or even
three-quarters or four-fifths of the shareholders to consent to the transaction.293
When there were multiple classes of voting stock present, each class was
required to approve the transaction by the minimum percentage.29 4
Even where the decision to merge was approved by the required
percentage, the merger could still be overturned by the courts if it was deemed
unfair to the minority. In New Jersey, for example, the court of chancery
enjoined the merger of five public utility companies into the Public Service
Electric and Gas Company, despite the fact that Public Service owned more
than two-thirds of the capital stock of the merging companies and could, as a
result, satisfy New Jersey's minimum approval requirement. 295 The minority
shareholders complained that the preferred stock they were to receive in
289.

WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,

7 CYCLOPEDIA

OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

8326 (1919).
290.

Kenneth Field, Nature ofand ProcedureforDirectPropertyOwningConsolidations,

5 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 230, 242 (1933).
291. FLETCHER, supra note 289, at 8329 ("[W]here each share of stock is entitled to one
vote the per cent is to be figured on the number of shares and not the number of holders.").
292. Under the Michigan statute, for example, directors needed to secure the consent of
two-thirds of the stockholders constituting a quorum. See THOMPSON &THOMPSON, supra note
286, at 95 (concerning the Michigan statute); Comment, StatutoryMerger and Consolidationof
Corporations,45 YALE L.J. 105, 113 n.43 (1935) [hereinafter StatutoryMerger] ("As a general
rule the required proportion must be of the total capital stock outstanding, though the Virginia
statute seems to require only that there be approval by a majority of the votes cast.").
293. See ROBERT S. STEVENS &ARTHUR LARSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 985 (1947) (stating that the "'majority' required is usually more than a simple
majority-often two-thirds, sometimes 75%"); Field, supra note 290, at 230 ("The most
common requirement is that the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock vote in favor of
the consolidation; but there is no uniformity from state to state-the amounts varying from a
mere majority of the votes cast to 100 per cent of the stock outstanding."); Statutory Merger,
supra note 292, at 107 n.8 ("At the present time statutory provisions in forty states authorize
sales of entire corporate assets on the consent of proportions of stockholders varying from a
majority to four-fifths.").
294. Statutory Merger,supra note 292, at 114.
295., Outwater v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 143 A. 729, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1928).
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exchange for their common stock was actually less secure than their previous
holdings. The court held that:
[T]he merger, in effect, is nothing less than a forced sale by the majority
stockholders to itself at a price fixed by it and payable at its pleasure. The
preferred stock is but the equivalent of a 6 per cent. promissory note
payable in three years at the option of the buyer. The merger legislation
countenances no such perversion of the contractual obligations of
stockholders inter sese. Continued membership, until dissolution, is an
inherent property right in corporate existence.296
The court thus effectively limited the majority's right to engage in a "freeze
out" merger.29 7
2. Legislative Approval

Although corporations could generally sell and acquire large amounts of
assets under the common law,298 there was no implied right to merge or
consolidate with another company. 299 Corporations needed to secure the
consent of the legislature in order to engage in a merger or consolidation. 300 As
William Meade Fletcher put it, "[l]egislative authority is just as essential to a
296.

Id. at 73 1.

297. See CHESTER ROHRIuCH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 137 (1933)
(stating that the "statutory power to dissolve given to the majority may not be used to 'freeze
out' the minority").
298. See Field, supra note 290, at 242 ("In the absence of express restrictions, business
corporations have the implied power to convey any or all of their real or personal property.").
Some authorities suggested that such a right was limited to a sale required by the exigencies of
the business. See HENRY WINTHRoP BALLANTrNE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 209 (1927)
(stating that there is a right to sell, if required by exigencies of the business). Ballantine wrote:
A purely private business corporation, like a manufacturing or trading company,
which is not given the right of eminent domain, and which owes no special duties
to the public, may sell and convey absolutely the whole of its property, when the
exigencies of its business require it to do so, or when the circumstances are such
that it can no longer profitably continue its business.
Id.; see also WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 437 (1925) ("Neither the
directors nor the majority of the stockholders have power to sell all the corporate property as
against the dissent of a single stockholder, unless the corporation is in a failing condition.").
299. See FIELD, supra note 277, at 461 (stating that there is no inherent power to
amalgamate or consolidate with other companies); FLETCHER,supra note 289, at 8313 (stating
the general rule that a corporation has no implied power to purchase stock in another
corporation).
300. See WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOKOFTHELAWOFPRIVATECORPORATIONS 191 (1.
Maurice Wormser ed., 3d ed. 1916) ("A corporation has no power to consolidate with another
corporation, unless the power is expressly conferred upon it.").
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valid consolidation or merger of existing corporations as it is to the creation of
a corporation in the first instance. '3 0 ' This could either come from a specific
grant of authority in the corporation's original charter or via a general grant of
authority by state statute.30 2
In many states, the principal problem was that there was no merger or
consolidation statute that blessed such transactions. At the time that the taxfree reorganization provision was being considered in 1934, only thirty-three
states and the Territory of Hawaii had general statutes authorizing corporations
to merge or consolidate.30 3 The fourteen remaining states, plus Alaska, the
District of Columbia, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico, had no special
provisions for conferring such authority. 304 Thus, in the absence of a charter
provision or special act of the legislature, corporations in those states were not
eligible to participate in such transactions. 0 5
Even where a state merger statute existed, it was often limited in scope.
Most of the early state law merger statutes restricted mergers based on the
powers granted to the corporations under their respective charters. The concern
appeared to be that an activity that would be ultra vires under the charter of one
corporation would suddenly become acceptable by virtue of the more
permissive charter of the combined enterprise. For example, in New Jersey, the
right to merge or consolidate was restricted to corporations organized to
undertake "any kind of business of the same or similar nature," the nature of the
business being determined by the charter or certificate of incorporation. 3
Under this provision, the New Jersey courts denied permission for the
consolidation of the United States Leather Company and the Central Leather
Company because, even though the companies were generally engaged in the
same line of business, the charter of one contained broader powers than the
charter of the other.30 7

301.
302.

FLETCHER, supra note 289, at

8313.

See CLARK, supra note 300, at 191-92 (discussing the power to consolidate);
FLETCHER, supra note 289, at 8315 (concerning how authority may be conferred).
303. Bank, supra note 72, at 1355.
304. id.
305. As one commentator noted, parties frequently got around this limitation by engaging
in a sale or similar transaction that had the same result as a merger or consolidation. Statutory
Merger, supra note 292, at 110 n.24. The transaction would still be subject to the restrictions
governing shareholder approval of fundamental corporate changes and to other restrictions on
sales of assets. See infra note 299 and accompanying text (stating that there was no implied
right to merge or consolidate with another company).
306. FLETCHER, supra note 289, at 8322.
307. Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 229, 239-40 (1909).
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During this same period, there were other similar examples of purpose and
*geographical restrictions. New York only permitted the consolidation of
corporations incorporated "for kindred purposes."30 ° Connecticut limited its statute
to parties "carrying on business of the same or a similar nature. 03t 9 Illinois only
permitted consolidation of "corporations of the same kind and engaged in the same
general business and carrying on their business in the same vicinity."31 0 Moreover,
while most such purpose restrictions had been removed or weakened by the
1930s, 31 1 many statutes still restricted a corporation's ability to merge or consolidate
with a corporation from another state, either by denying the power to engage in the
transaction altogether or by a requirement that the surviving party be a domestic
corporation.312 In some cases, the merger or consolidation even had to be
313 approved
by a state regulatory board or corporation commission to be effective.
While sales of large amounts of corporate assets were permitted under the
common law, they were often subject to many of the same statutory restrictions as
mergers or consolidations. According to one contemporary commentator:
Although merger and consolidation is strictly statutory and a sale of assets is
essentially contractual, as a practical matter in a given case it may be extremely
difficult to decide whether the device employed was merger and consolidation
or a sale of31assets
inasmuch as today, the latter also usually follows a statutory
4
procedure.

3. FederalOversight
In addition to the oversight exercised by state legislatures, fundamental
corporate changes were subject to federal oversight. The earliest and most
308.

York).

See

FLETCHER, supra note

289, at 8323 (citing the requirements for merger in New

309. 1901 Conn. Pub. Acts 157.
310. 1895 Ill. Laws 31.
311. See Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at !10 (commenting that such business
restrictions had largely disappeared, but they were still relevant for public utilities, insurance
companies, banks, and trust companies).
312. See Bank, supranote 72, at 1355 (describing merger restrictions).
313. See Statutory Merger, supra note 292, at 114 (stating that is not infrequent,
"particularly in respect to public utility and railroad companies, to make the approval of some
state regulatory board or commission a condition precedent").
314. Id. at 107 (noting, however, that the statutes governing sales of entire corporate assets
differed in form and substance from those governing mergers or consolidations). See also
BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 210 ("In recent years statutes authorizing such disposition [of
the entire property of the corporation] by the consent of a majority, or two-thirds or threequarters of the stockholders of a solvent, going concern have become common.").
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prominent source of this oversight was the Sherman Antitrust Act. Adopted in
1890, this Act held that "every contract, combination, in the form of a trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations" was illegal.315 Vague language, the failure to provide for an
agency to implement the Act, and the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the
law hampered its effectiveness, 6 but it provided the basis for later federal
challenges of merger activity during Theodore Roosevelt's administration.
In 1902, Roosevelt directed his attorney general to revive the then-dormant
Sherman Act by pursuing an antitrust action against the Northern Securities
318
Company. 317 Two years later, the Court ordered the company's dissolution.
Emboldened by his success, which earned him the "trust-buster" label, Roosevelt set
his sights on even bigger targets. Thus, Roosevelt brought separate federal antitrust
actions against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company.
After protracted litigation, in 1911 the Supreme Court issued opinions ordering that
both Standard Oil and American Tobacco be broken up into several smaller
companies.3 19 While these victories were far from complete, they did mark a
departure from "the uncritical approval
of business expansion" that characterized the
320
early-to-mid nineteenth century.
Perhaps more importantly, the results may have chilled some transactions.
According to one 1913 edition of a practitioner's treatise, "[t]he general result
of the federal decisions in the Tobacco, Standard Oil, and other similar cases
has been to leave the situation in perplexing uncertainty. At the present time it
is not possible for counsel to advise what can be safely done in forming
industrial combinations."3 2' The same treatise noted that:
315. Act of July 2, 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890).
316. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 465 (1985) (discussing
the deficiencies of the Sherman Act); GEISST, supra note 36, at 104-05 (stating that the
Sherman Act had "few teeth"); HORwlTz, supra note 277, at 84 (concerning the Supreme
Court's decision that the Act could not constitutionally reach manufacturing); JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT &

ADRIAN

WOOLDRIDGE,

THE COMPANY:

A

SHORT HISTORY OF A

REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 73 (2003) (stating that the Sherman Antitrust Act failed to set out many

ways of punishing or preventing monopolies). The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act
was inapplicable to manufacturing companies because they did not engage in "commerce."
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 7 (1895).
317.

ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF

AMERICA: 1600 TO TmPRESENT 212 (2d ed. 1984).
318. N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
319. See Standard Oil Co. ofN. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,79-80(1911) (breaking up
Standard Oil); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187-88 (1911) (breaking up
American Tobacco).
320. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 317, at 213.
321. THOMAS CONYNUTON, A MANUAL OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 350 (3d ed. 1913),
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At present few new combinations are being formed. The Sherman Antitrust
Law, after many years of more or less innocuous desuetude, finally became
a live law. The business world, which had considered its provisions
negligible, was dismayed to find that it really meant something and that it
could be enforced
against the largest and most firmly entrenched
322
combinations.
Soon after the resolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases, Congress enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1916 to further buttress
federal oversight in this area.323 By outlawing interlocking directorates,
Congress sought to prevent indirect combinations of companies that were in
restraint of trade.324 Unlike the Sherman Act, this measure was accompanied
by the creation of an enforcement agency, the Federal Trade Commission,
which served to investigate unfair trade practices and issue cease and desist
orders.325 While neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act posed serious
obstacles to business combinations, 26 they had established the specter of
federal oversight. The threat of antitrust enforcement action meant that even
directors of corporations with willing shareholders and permissive state merger
statutes did not have a free hand to engage in transactions as they saw fit.

B. DividendPolicies
While managers were accustomed to strict limitations on their abilities to
engage in mergers, acquisitions, and other fundamental corporate changes, it
was a different story when it came to dividend policy. There were some
limitations on the source of a dividend payment, but these limitations related to
the source of funds rather than the decision to issue a dividend. The decision of
whether to issue a dividend or retain the profits for other uses was committed to
the discretion of the board of directors by well-established law. Moreover, this
legal right to retain earnings was buttressed by the business custom, which took
hold around the turn of the century, of retaining a significant percentage of
Part of the uncertainty was the Court's use of the "rule of reason" approach, which meant that
some combinations in restraint of trade could be permitted if they were reasonable under the
circumstances.
322. Id. at 357.
323. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000) (concerning the codification of the Clayton Act).
324.

See GEIssr, supra note 36, at 143-44 (discussing passage of the Clayton Act).

325. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) (concerning the establishment of the Federal Trade
Commission).
326. Indeed, the great merger movement at the turn of the century followed the passage of
the Sherman Act.
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earnings each year. Thus, it should not be surprising that corporate managers
mounted an all-out assault against the undistributed profits tax and its threat to
their continued discretion over dividend policy.
1. Early History
In the infancy of the corporation, dividends were essentially
unregulated.3 27 This policy was in part because during the days of the joint
stock trading company, a corporation would distribute all of its assets at the
completion of each voyage. 328 There was little need to impose significant limits
on the distribution of profits in these essentially single-purpose enterprises.
This era of unregulated dividends, however, soon came to an end because of
two developments in corporate law and finance. First, the advent of the
concept of fixed, or permanent, capital from which a corporation's earnings
would flow meant that there had to be some method of distinguishing between
that part of the corporation's assets that was available for distribution as a
dividend and that part of the assets that constituted its capital and would remain
within the corporation. Second, the development of limited liability for
corporate stockholders elevated the importance of both the distinction between
capital and income and the distinction between the assets in the hands of the
corporation and the assets in the hands of its stockholders. The former was
important because under a system of limited liability creditors would often
decide to extend credit based upon the value and availability of the fixed or
permanent property of the corporation. If this property was subject to division
prior to the liquidation of the corporation, the creditors would have virtually no
protection at all. The latter was important because, unlike the general
partnership where partners remained personally liable for the partnership debts
even after a distribution, the creditor's only recourse for repayment of the debts
was to look to the assets held in the corporation. A dividend would
permanently remove those assets from the corporate solution. These two

327. See Donald Kehl, The Origin andEarly Development ofAmerican DividendLaw, 53
HARV. L. REv. 36, 37 (1939) ("The earliest English joint-stock-company charters contained no
provisions regulating the declaration of dividends.").
328. Id. at 37-38 ("[T]he practice, peculiar to the first joint-stock trading companies, of
raising a separate joint stock for each voyage made dividend regulation unnecessary, since under
this system there were no limitations upon the fund from which dividends could be paid."). This
practice was true even in the colonies, where a non-chartered joint stock company, Plymouth
Adventurers, provided that after seven years "the capitall [sic] and profits, viz. the houses, lands,
goods and chattels be equally divided amongst the adventurers." Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
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developments led to a spate of statutory and non-statutory limitations on the
distribution of profits in a corporation.
2. Dividends PaidOut of "Profits"
The first limitation on dividends was the requirement that dividends be
paid exclusively from the profits of the corporation, as distinct from the
"capital," or the money originally contributed by the stockholders.3" Initially,
companies followed such a rule by custom. Thus, after the British East India
Company established a permanent joint stock in 1657, dividends were
henceforth issued "out of profits leaving the capital untouched. 330 Before
long, however, the Crown began to impose such a "profits" limitation through
the charters of the corporations it authorized. The 1694 charter of the Bank of
England provided that:
[N]o dividend shall at any time be made by the said governor and company
save only out of the interest, profit or produce arising by or out of the said
capital stock,
or fund, or by such dealing as is allowed by Act of
33
Parliament. '

This type of limitation continued during the special charter era in America,
although the provisions tended to be ad hoc in nature. 32 In 1825, New York
enacted the first general dividend statute in the country, which limited
333
dividends to "surplus profits arising from the business of such corporations.,
329. See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 435
(2d ed. 1886) ("It is a fundamental rule, that dividends can be paid only out of profits or the net
increase of the capital of a corporation, and cannot be drawn upon the capital contributed by the
shareholders for the purpose of carrying on the company's business."); Cyrus LaRue Munson,
Dividends, I YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1891) (concerning payment of dividends). Munson wrote:
It is fundamental that dividends are payable only from the profits of the
corporation, and that they cannot be paid from any portion of the capital stock,
from compensation for property taken under the power of eminent domain, from a
penalty recovered from a contractor for a failure to complete his work, or from the
sale of forfeited stock.

Id.
Kehl, supra note 327, at 38 nn.12-13 (citing COURT MIN rES OF THE EAST INDIA
1660-1663, at xx-xxi, 131 (1922)).
331. J.W. GILBART, I THE HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE OF BANKING 32-33 (A.S.
Michie ed., 1882).
332. Kehl, supra note 327, at 43-51 ("[Tlhe development of American dividend law prior
to 1825, when New York enacted the first general dividend regulation statute, is the history of
ad hoc legislation by special charters granted to individual corporations.").
333. 1825 N.Y. Laws 325.
330.

COMPANY
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This statute became the model for nineteenth century general corporation law
provisions governing dividends. 334 There was still little agreement as to how to
distinguish between profits and capital, but it was well established that such a
distinction itself was important.33 5
3. Penaltiesfor DividendsPaid Out of Capital
A second rule imposed penalties on the directors and stockholders for
any distribution of dividends out of capital. When Parliament authorized
an increase in the capital stock of the Bank of England in 1697, it provided
that if the corporation issued a dividend that reduced its capital stock
without first reducing its outstanding debt, the stockholders "shall be
severally liable" to any creditors of the Bank.336 A similar rule was
imported to America, where a commonly cited Massachusetts statute
provided that "[i]f the directors of any such company shall declare and pay
any dividend, when the company is insolvent or any dividend, the payment
of which would render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and severally liable
for all the debts of the company" in an amount not to exceed the amount of
the dividend.3 37 The New York statute was even broader, imposing liability
on the directors if a dividend reduced the capital stock of the company,
even if it did not induce insolvency. 338 By the end of the century, New
York had gone one step further, making it a misdemeanor to declare a
dividend out of the capital stock of the corporation.33 9 In general, these
director liability statutes were made necessary by the conferral of limited
liability on corporate stockholders. As one early observer noted, "iflimited
by
liability was to survive, a rule against impairment of corporate'' capital
4
0
inevitable.
was
stockholders
to
repayments
dividends or other

334. Kehl, supra note 327, at 61 ("With these fundamental dividend limitations established
in the general corporate laws of New York and Massachusetts, other states began the process of
copying them.").
335. See MoRAwETz, supra note 329, §§ 437-39 (concerning capital versus net profits
distinction).
336. Kehl, supra note 327, at 42.
337. 1836 Mass. Acts 38.
338. See 1825 N.Y. Laws 325 (making it unlawful to reduce capital stock).
339. Munson, supra note 329, at 193.
340. Kehi, supra note 327, at 41.
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4. Dividends Under the Sole Discretion of the Board of Directors
A third rule, which followed naturally from the first two, was that a
corporation's directors had the sole discretion to determine whether to
declare a dividend. This rule was made clear early on in the development
of dividend limitations in this country. Alexander Hamilton drafted a
charter for the Bank of North America that authorized the directors to
"make from time to time such dividends, out of the profits, as they may
think proper.3 4 1 A similar provision in the charter of the Bank of the
United States permitted as much dividends out of profits "as shall appear to
the directors advisable. 3 42 As one commentator affirmed, by the early
1890s there was little doubt as to the board of directors' power over
whether to declare a dividend: "The directors, being the agents of the
corporation, alone have the power to determine the amount and to declare a
dividend from its earnings-a power resting in their honest discretion,
uncontrollable3 43
by the courts, when not exercised illegally, wantonly or
oppressively.
Under this highly developed legal infrastructure, a stockholder had
little legal recourse in the event the directors of a corporation chose not to
distribute a dividend. There were some cases that appeared to support a
stockholder's right to petition for the division of surplus profits, 344 but
341. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
342. Id.
343. Munson, supra note 329, at 196. There were occasional exceptions, but these were
rare. Arthur Stone Dewing explained:
In rare cases the dividends are declared by the stockholders, in accordance with a
provision of the bylaws. Among early corporations the stockholders' control over
dividend disbursement was quite usual. Such a reservation of power is now very
rare; it runs counter to the generally accepted theory of the powers and
responsibilities of directors.
ARTHUR STONE DEWING, I THE FINANcIAL POUCY Or CORMORATIONS 91 n.dd (5th ed. 1953).
344. See Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co., 29 Ala. 503, 507-08 (1857) (concerning the
directors' discretion to distribute dividends). The court wrote:
They may be compelled to exercise that discretion, if they improperly fail or refuse
to exercise it. But when they have exercised it, without any violation of the charter
or constitution of the company, their action cannot be disregarded or controlled by
any court, at the instance of a stockholder, unless it is shown to have been a willful
abuse of their discretion, or the result of bad faith, or of a willful neglect or breach
of a known duty.
Id.; see also Scott v. Eagle Fire Co., 7 Paige Ch. 198, 203 (N.Y. Ch. 1838) ("[S]hould they
without reasonable cause refuse to divide what is actually surplus profits, the stockholders are
not without remedy, if they apply to the proper tribunal, before the corporation has become
insolvent.").

TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS

1223

these cases relied primarily on exceptions, rather than alternatives, to the
rule. Henry Ballantine wrote that "there must be bad faith or a clear abuse
of discretion on their part to justify a court of equity in interfering" in the
directors' determination of dividend policy.3 45 The right to a dividend was, in
effect, not a right at all. As one contemporary commentator described it, "[t]he
right of a stockholder to share in the surplus of profits is in the nature of tn
inchoate right, until a distribution or dividend has been actually declared by the
proper officers of the corporation. 3 46 Justice Thomas Cooley, writing on
behalf of the Michigan Supreme Court, explained "[u]ntil that time [when the
the dividend is only something that may possibly come
dividend is declared]
3 47
into existence.
5.Business Custom
Corporate managers used their legal discretion to justify adherence to a
corporate finance norm favoring retained earnings. While the conventional
wisdom during much of the nineteenth century had been to distribute all or
almost all of a corporation's earnings as dividends and raise expansion capital
through the debt or equity markets,3 48 by World War I the conventional wisdom
was that a corporation should "plow back" a substantial percentage of its
earnings to fund expansion, protect against downturns, maintain regular
dividend policies, and provide for unexpected expenses. 34 In his 1917 treatise
on business finance, William Lough noted that "[i]t is generally agreed that
345. BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 507. Ballantine further explained:
The mere fact that a corporation has surplus profits out of which a dividend might
lawfully be declared is not of itself sufficient ground for a court of equity to compel
the directors to make a dividend, for they have a right to use surplus profits to
extend the business of the corporation, or to make improvements, and to establish
various reserves, if it is to the interests of the corporation to do so, and a court of
equity will not interfere with or control their discretion in determining what the
interests of the corporation require in this respect, unless there is a clear abuse of
discretion.

Id.
346. H.W.R., Dividends, 9 CENT. LJ. 161,163 (1879).
347. Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76, 78 (1875).
348. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoatfor Declining Dividends? Evidence
from History, 56 TAx L. REv. 463, 467-68 (2003).
349. KENNETH S. VAN STRUM, INVESTING IN PURCHASING POWER 24 (1926) ("A corporation
often invests a part of its income in new plants and in equipment, which means that instead of
paying out all of its income in dividends it 'plows back' into the company some of its earnings
for the future benefit of the stockholder.").
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regular dividends combined with large-or at least adequate-savings out of
annual income should be features of the financial management of most
corporations. 3 50 A few years later, one observer reported that "[t]oday it is
taken for granted that no corporation shall pay out more than a fraction of its
earnings. 351
The available data suggests that this development in corporate finance
theory was followed by a majority of companies. While dividends hovered
around 80% to 90% of earnings prior to the turn of the century, they had
dropped to approximately 50% to 60% of earnings during the first few decades
of the twentieth century. 52 According to one study, the majority of companies
retained as much as 55% of their earnings during the period between 1922 and
1930. 3 53 This retained earnings norm was bolstered by a corresponding norm in
favor of regular dividends, rather than dividends that fluctuated with earnings.
In the 1926 edition of his corporate finance treatise, Arthur Dewing noted that
"[t]he regularity of dividend payments helps the corporation in two very
important respects. It creates a loyal group of stockholders who hold their stock
for investment and not for speculation. It3 also
creates a strong credit to be
54
market.
open
the
in
borrowing
for
utilized
The demand for regular or level dividends was in part a byproduct of the
introduction of preferred stock. The early American corporation only had one
class of stock, and each shareholder had the same right to dividends as any
other shareholder.3 55 Starting around the middle of the nineteenth century,
however, transportation companies, particularly in the railroad industry, began
to offer a preferred level of stock as a method of attracting equity capital.356
350. WILLIAM H. LOUGH, BUSINESS FINANCE 477 (1917).
351. Oswald W.Knauth, The Place of CorporateSurplus in the National Income, 18 J.

AM. STAT. ASS'N 157, 164 (June 1922).
352. COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, COMMON-STOCK INDEXES 2 (2d
ed., 1939) [hereinafter COWLES COMMISSION]. See also Jack W. Wilson & Charles P. Jones, An

Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles 's Extensions: Price Indexes and Stock Returns,

1870-1999, 75 J. Bus. 505 app. at 527-31 tbl.AI (2002) (standardizing and updating the data
originally compiled by the Cowles Commission for the period 1871 through 1939).
353. See O.J. Curry, Utilization of Corporate Profits in Prosperityand Depression, 9
MICH. Bus. STUD. 1, 35 (1941) (stating that the sample size was 72 companies).

354.

ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POUCY OF CORPORATIONS

1926).

549 (rev. ed.

355. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., The EarlyHistory of PreferredStock in the United
States, 19 AM. ECON. REv. 43, 43 (1929) [hereinafter Evans, Early HistoryofPreferredStock]
("During the earliest days of the corporation in the United States the holder of each share of
stock received the same dividend as the holder of any other share in the same company.").
356.

See

JONATHON BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR.,

A HISTORY

OF CORPORATE

FINANCE 152 (1997) (explaining that preferred stock developed as a financial innovation in
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These securities had characteristics of both debt and equity. They provided for
guaranteed dividend rates similar to interest payments on debt, but the holder
could not foreclose on the instrument if his dividends fell in arrears. s Toward
the end of the century, the preferred stock method expanded to industrial
securities,358 where the guaranteed dividend rate was attractive in unregulated
industries with little or no financial disclosure. For the individual who formerly
invested exclusively in debt securities, preferred stock was a middle359ground
of debt.
between the risk of common stock and the relative certainty

Although a board of directors could refuse to issue any preferred dividend
at all, there was significant pressure to distribute the promised amount. The
fact that most early preferred stocks appeared to have been issued on a
cumulative basis only increased this pressure. 360 The cumulative feature meant
a board of directors deciding in favor of declaring a dividend in a particular
Britain as a means to raise capital to complete construction of financially troubled canals and
railroads); Evans, Early History of PreferredStock, supra note 355, at 43 (stating that the
condition started to disappear in the transportation industry, and railroads and canals); George
Heberton Evans, Jr., PreferredStock in the United States 1850-1878, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 56,
56 (1931 ) (noting that preferred stock was generally confined to railroad and canal companies).
357. See BASKIN & MIRANTi, supranote 356, at 152 ("[A] corporation could not be forced
into receivership if dividends, unlike bond interest, fell in arrears."). Some corporations even
allowed the preferred stock holder to participate in dividends beyond the guaranteed rate, but
this was the exception rather than the rule. See id. (stating that preference shares, if the shares
were participating, could receive dividends in excess of the guaranteed rate); W.H.S. Stevens,
Stockholders' Participationsin Profits. 1,9 J. Bus. U. Cm. 114, 121-22 (1936) (noting with
respect to a 1902 issuance of preferred stock by the American Brake Shoe and Foundry
Company in which the preferred stock received all the residual profits after the common stock
was paid a fixed dividend, that "[t]his type of issue is so rare, however, as to constitute
something of a curiosity, although one would be rash to assert that no other such issues have
been made").
358. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., Early Industrial PreferredStocks in the United
States, 40 J. POL. ECON. 227, 227 (1932) (stating that during the third quarter of the nineteenth
century preferred stock developed into a distinct type with many special rights and privileges,
mainly for railroad financing); Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for
IndustrialSecurities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus. HIST. REV. 105, 116 (1955) ("The type of security
that was to play a key role in the emerging market for industrials was the preferred stock.").
359. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supranote 356, at 152 (noting that preferred stock combined
the features of both fixed-income and equity securities).
360. See ARTHUR STONE DEwING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 124 (1919)
(noting that while early preferred stock was often non-cumulative because of the speculative
nature of industrial enterprises, by 1897, when many businesses were on more stable ground, the
preferred dividend rate was commonly made cumulative); Evans, Early History of Preferred
Stock, supra note 355, at 56 (concerning issuance of preferred stocks on cumulative basis).
Even when a charter was ambiguous on this point, courts generally found the preferred stock to
be cumulative on the grounds that the preferred stockholder implicitly contracted for a certain
rate of dividends, regardless of the profits of the corporation. Evans, Early HistoryofPreferred
Stock, supra note 355, at 61-62.
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year first would have to pay the preferred stockholders for all past and current
dividends due before paying any dividend to the common stockholders; While
this provision helped attract capital by making the equity instrument seem more
debt-like, it further increased the pressure to meet the preferred dividend
payment.3 61 Managers could avoid the binding nature of the cumulative
provision by inducing the preferred shareholders to agree to a
recapitalization,36 2 but in practice they paid dividends whenever possible.363
The advent of preferred stock not only introduced the notion of a
guaranteed dividend rate for preferred stockholders, but it also created the
climate for a quasi-guaranteed, regular dividend for all stockholders. Although
a corporation could continue to pay the preferred dividend while choosing to
pass on dividends for holders ofthe common stock, discriminating between the
classes of stock was often difficult. This was especially true when promoters
had promised that the common stockholders would receive a regular dividend.
One observer noted that:
[T]o the holders of common stock it seemed unreasonable and unjust that,
in such prosperous times, a discrimination should be made in favor of the
preferred stock. The reputation of the management of many of the
industrial combinations was seriously injured by their failure to redeem
their promises of dividends on the common stock.3 4

361. As one commentator noted in chronicling the rise of the United States Steel
Corporation:
No matter how necessary the passing of their early dividends and accumulation of
large reserves by the steel trusts may be judged to have been, so far as the preferred
stock was concerned, in view of the cumulative provisions included in the contract
with this class of stockholders, it was impossible.
Edward Sherwood Meade, The Genesis ofthe United States Steel Corporation, 15 Q. J. ECoN.
517, 524 (1901).
362. See DEWING, supra note 360, at 125-26 ("[]f a considerable amount of the unpaid
dividends accumulate, and the company meets with more prosperous conditions, the managers,
who probably control the common stock, will often try to induce the preferred shareholders to
surrender their claims on the plea of some equitable adjustment.").
363. Id. at 125. Dewing writes:
Ifthe corporations earns the dividend on the preferred it will probably be paid; if it
does not earn the dividend and the directors 'adjust' the books so that they may pay
the dividend, lest the obligation accumulate, the preferred stockholders are not only
deceived, but also have lasting injury done to their interests.
Id.; see also Meade, supra note 361, at 524 (concerning management's reluctance to allow
preferred stock to accumulate).
364. Meade, supra note 361, at 525.
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As stock ownership spread, the demand for regularity in dividend
payments increased.3 65 Whereas fewer than 4.5 million individuals owned
stock in 1900, more than triple that number-almost 14.5 million-owned
shares by. 1922.366 The growth in stock ownership not only increased the size
of the stockholding population, it changed the face of the typical stockholder.
For example, by World War I, stock ownership had spread to middle income
individuals.367 This new type of stockholder viewed dividends as one of his or
her primary sources of income. One economist, writing in 1924, noted that
over the last quarter century, "[t]he tendency toward a more democratic
distribution of beneficiary interests in the corporations of the country has been
attended by an increase in the number of people who are getting a portion of
their income from their accumulated savings. 3 68 Although stockholders may
have been worse off in the long term with the more conservative dividend
policies,369 regularity was important both for stockholders who depended upon
the dividends for monthly expenses and for those who saw dividends as a signal
of a stable financial company.
Corporations took advantage of this demand for regularity by publicly
announcing their shifts in dividend policy.3 70 The United States Rubber
Company, for example, had been characterized by wildly erratic earnings and
365. See Donald E. Wilbur, A Study ofthe Policy ofDividend Stabilization, 10 HARv. Bus.
REv.373, 373 (1932) ("With the expansion of the stock market and the wide distribution of
equities among the American public, new significance has been placed upon the importance of
maintaining regular dividends year in and year out.").
366. H.T. Warshow, The Distribution ofCorporate Ownership in the United States, 39 Q.
J. EcoN. 15, 16 (1924).
367. See id.
at 16-17 (stating that there has been a shift of ownership of corporations from

the wealthier classes to those of moderate and small means). It had also spread to new
demographic groups, such as women. See LOUGH, supra note 350, at 441 (noting, for example,
that "[a]pproxiniately half the stockholders of the New Haven Railroad are women").
368. Warshow, supra note 366, at 15. Joseph Kennedy, writing a few years later,
concurred in this assessment, observing that "millions of people have become investors in
securities and count upon continuity of their dividend returns in budgeting their living expenses.
Anything that would interrupt the continuous flow of dividends will rob the thrifty American
investor of part of his livelihood." Joseph P. Kennedy, Big Business, What Now?, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Jan. 16, 1937, at 80.
369. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SEcuRiTy ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE 375-76 (2d ed. 1940) (concerning the disadvantages of preferred stocks); Curry,
supra note 353, at 17 ("Earning withheld for corporate purposes naturally strengthen the
corporation temporarily. Whether the action proves profitable to the stockholder depends upon
subsequent events generally and timely action of the individual stockholder in selling his
stock.").
370. In 1907, for example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company announced an
$8 per year regular dividend. See DEWING, supra note 343, at 763 n.ee (discussing the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company dividend).
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dividends since its founding in 1892.37 1 In 1911, after an eleven-year drought
in dividend payments, the company announced that it would commence paying
a four percent regular annual dividend on its common stock.372 As a result of
this move, United States Rubber's stock rose twelve points in less than two
weeks, underscoring the importance of regularity for common stockholders.37 3
The problem with regular dividends was that the earnings of all companies
fluctuated to some extent. During down years, a corporation would not be able
to pay out the dividend, and the goal of regularity would be defeated. As
Dewing observed, "A regularity in dividend payments must therefore be
superimposed on an irregularity of earnings."3 74 To achieve this result, experts
advised companies to retain a certain amount of their earnings each year as a
cushion. Lough warned that "dividends must not be allowed to rise, even in the
most prosperous periods, above a conservative estimate of the minimum
earnings of the company. 37 5 While corporations did sometimes deviate from
this conservative dividend policy to distribute additional amounts in a
particularly profitable year, they maintained a policy of regularity by referring
to such amounts as an "extra" or "special" dividend paid on top of the regular
dividend.3 76
V. Conclusion
The influence of legal and non-legal norms of corporate behavior on the
fate of corporate tax initiatives may have significant relevance for modem tax
policy. In the New Deal examples described in this paper, corporate managers
371. See DEwING, supra note 354, at 548 n.j (describing the dividend policy of the United
States Rubber Company).
372.

See Dividend on Rubber Common, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1911, at 15 (concerning the

company's payment of an annual dividend). In an announcement regarding the move, the
company's president explained "notwithstanding the fact that for some years past the surplus net
earnings have been considerably in excess of the sum required for dividends upon the preferred
stocks, the Directors have felt it for the best interests of the company to defer payments on the
common." Id. He attributed the current move to asubstantial gain from its automobile tire line.
Id.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
DEwING, supra note 354, at 547.
LOUGH, supra note 350, at 444.
See, e.g., Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1907, at 13 ("At a meeting of the Board of

Directors of the New York Produce Exchange Bank, held this day, a semi-annual dividend of

Three (3%) Per Cent was declared and an extra dividend of One (1%) Per Cent payable April
15th."). See also DEWING, supra note 354, at 561 (noting that the dividend iscalled an "extra"
dividend to signal to the shareholders that it isnot permanent).
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fiercely resisted a measure that attempted to impose a new norm of corporate
behavior-a norm of higher dividends and limited managerial discretion over
dividend policy. By contrast, corporate managers only offered minimal
resistance to a measure that merely reinforced an existing norm of corporate
behavior-the norm of state, federal, and shareholder oversight for mergers and
acquisitions-and those changes have essentially endured to the modem day.
While there is no evidence whether either tax measure did have, or could have
had, the effect on the underlying corporate behavior that Congress intended, the
difference in the fate of each measure is a cautionary tale for corporate
reformers seeking to enact governance measures through the tax code. If the
New Deal examples are not atypical-an important qualifier in determining the
modem relevance of any historical study-the implication is that Congress can
reinforce existing norms through the Code, but it will have more difficulty if it
seeks to initiate such norms through the tax laws.
Far from being atypical, the New Deal examples studied in this piece have
modem analogies. For instance, the corporate norms-based explanation may
help explain the outcome of recent attempts to use the tax code to regulate
corporate governance in the area of executive compensation. In 1993,
Congress enacted section 162(m) in an attempt to control excessive executive
compensation.3 7 Under this provision, corporations are subject to a one
million dollar cap on the deductibility of compensation provided to any of its
top five executives, subject to an exception for "any remuneration payable
solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals."3 78 In
this case, the exception was designed to swallow the rule. As one Treasury
official explained, section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue raising
provision, but a behavior-shaping provision. The exception for performancebased compensation 'is not a loophole."' 379 The intention was to encourage
corporations to switch from guaranteed salary arrangements to more
performance-based executive compensation packages, including those centered
on company stock and stock options in order to better align pay with
performance.38 °
While section 162(m) has survived, it has been undermined through
managerial resistance and avoidance. According to one observer, the rule is

377. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211,107 Stat.
312, 469-71 (1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000)).
378. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2000).
379. Megan M. Reilly, Former Treasury OfficialDiscusses Executive Compensation Cap,
62 TAx NOTES 747, 747 (1994) (quoting Catherine Creech).
380. 'Bank, supra note 22, at 305-06 (1995).
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"completely inoperative" as a limit on executive compensation.381 It has failed
to stem the growth of executive compensation packages, and business leaders
and tax lawyers believe that it has actually "encouraged bloated executive pay"
by creating a one million dollar minimum wage for executives and a push for
large stock option grants.38 2 According to one report:
"[Elxecutive pay actually rose at a 29 percent faster rate in the first year
after the law took effect than in the previous 14 years the service had
collected comparable information." From 1994 to 1995, corporate
deductions for executive pay increased more than 9.1%, compared with an
average increase of 7%between 1980 and 1994.383
Moreover, early on, corporate managers found ways to subvert the original goal
of aligning pay with performance by resorting to the derivatives market.3 4
Many prominent investors and former government officials have now admitted
defeat and are calling for the provision's repeal.38 5
When viewed from the perspective of the underlying corporate norm at
stake, this outcome should have been quite predictable. While early charters
sometimes fixed the corporate managers' salaries or made them subject to a
vote of a majority of the stockholders, 8 6 executive compensation has long been
the exclusive province of the board of directors. As the author of one treatise
observed in 1933, "Salaries paid to officers must bear some reasonable relation
to the value of their services. But courts will not review salaries voted by the
board unless they are so clearly excessive as to amount a fraud upon the

381. Tom Herman, Tax Report, Congress Should Repeal a 1993 Tax-Law Change on
Executive Pay, Business Leaders Say, WALL ST. J.ONLINE, Sept. 19,2002 (quoting Gail Fosler

of the Conference Board's Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise).
382. Id.; see also John A. Byrne, That Eye-Popping Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 25,
1994, at 57 (concerning CEO salaries).
383. Stabile, supra note 7, at 89 (quoting David Cay Johnston, Executive Pay Increases at
a Much Faster Rate than Corporate Revenues and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at D4).

384. See Bank, supra note 22, at 320-23 (describing how the equity swap was used in
response to the dilemma). Some of these attempts were subsequently limited by tax and
securities law provisions. See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466 (stating that "the most effective tax
constraint on exercising options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options").
385. See Herman, supra note 381 (citing Warren Buffett, former Federal Reserve Board
Chair Paul Volcker, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, and former Commerce Secretary Peter
Peterson as calling for the law's speedy demise).
386. See THOMAS CONYNGTON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: ITS MECHANISM, METHODS,
FORMATION AND MANAGEMENT 67 (3d ed. 1908) (stating that regulations usually limited the
amount to be paid in salaries, but some flexibility was generally given to these regulations by a

provision that the limits set could be exceeded with the consent of some specified majority of
the stockholders).
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corporation. 38 7 Recently, securities laws have attempted to impose various
disclosure requirements for executive compensation, 3s 8 but shareholders still
have no say in the compensation process under state laws. They also tend to
remain quite passive even when the information is disclosed. 38 9 Thus,
managers are likely to resist attempts to indirectly control compensation
through the tax code, and shareholders are not going to view such resistance as
a violation of existing norms.
This attempt to override existing corporate norms is what distinguishes tax
provisions such as section 162(m) from those tax provisions that have been
praised for their corporate governance benefits by modern scholars. David
Schizer, for instance, has argued that taxation is an ally in the corporate
governance arena by providing constraints on executives seeking to reduce the
incentive effects of their options to purchase employer stock.39 0 Through rules
governing exit strategies with respect to options, such as the disincentive to
exercise under section 83 and the disincentives to hedging resulting from both
the constructive sale rules and the mismatch between capital and ordinary rates
in a hedge, the tax system helps to bolster the incentive effects. 39' Schizer
conceded, however, that "[a]lthough Congress sometimes deliberately uses the
tax code to pursue corporate governance objectives, the tax constraints on
exercising and hedging options do not fall into this category."3 92 Some of the
advantage in this case may be that the rules in question did not appear to
constitute a threat, but the distinction runs deeper.
The corporate benefits in this case may be more than a mere indirect
benefit of provisions adopted on tax policy grounds; they may be the direct
benefit of tax provisions that support existing corporate norms of behavior,
rather than trying to install new ones. In the case of hedging, Schizer found
387. RoHRucH, supra note 297, at 116; see BALLA tNE, supra note 298, at 408 (noting
that while directors cannot fix their own salaries, "[i]t is within the powers of the directors to fix
the salaries of other officers appointed by them, although from their own number, unless there is
some provision to the contrary, and to fix the compensation to be paid officers for extraordinary
services which they engage or authorize").
388. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 481 (2002)
(describing disclosure requirements).
389. See id. at 481-82 (stating that the SEC's rules overstep the boundaries between the
federal and state regulatory spheres and that the theory of rational shareholder apathy predicts
that most shareholders prefer to be passive investors).
390. See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466 ("[T]he most effective tax constraint on exercising
options derives from tax rules for so-called nonqualified options, which were not fashioned with
corporate governance in mind.").
391. See id. at 466-94 (describing the various tax barriers to exercising and hedging).
392. Id. at 466.
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that firms either banned the practice directly or raised its costs indirectly by
preventing executives from pledging their option grants. 3 While Schizer
considered such constraints to be ineffective or incomplete, 394 they suggest that
executive hedging of option grants is disfavored under corporate law and
practice. Schizer confirmed this by predicting that if the tax limitations were
repealed, shareholders and executives would likely cooperate in erecting
contract and securities law barriers to fill the gap. 395 Thus, the use of tax law in
this instance was merely to reinforce the existing norm of corporate behavior
rather than to change it altogether. This theory appears to help explain why tax
may have been an ally of corporate governance measures in limiting executive
hedging, while being either ineffective or counterproductive in controlling
executive compensation more generally.
Thus, at least in these examples, norms appear to have some relevance in
distinguishing between corporate governance-oriented tax provisions. While
more study may be beneficial on this point, the basic premise is intuitively
appealing. Provisions that help reinforce existing norms may be better
received, which will aid in their prospects for long-term success. By contrast,
those provisions designed to initiate new norms or overturn existing ones are
much more likely to face opposition and fail. The implication of the historical
evidence seems clear: Tax can be considered an ally of corporate governance,
but not a de facto system of federal corporate law.

393. Id. at 460.
394. Id.

395. Id. at 495.
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